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A Critical Analysis of the Department of Transportation
I. INTRODUCTION
Having developed slowly over several decades, the American transporta-
tion system became a complex and vital mammoth by the middle of the
twentieth century. Today 90 million motor vehicles and 97,000 private
and commercial aircraft make up part of a transportation system that
has required a private investment of over $4.5 billion each year. Trans-
portation is one of America's largest employers, utilizing well over 2.5
million men and women.' The terrific impact which the transportation
industry has made upon the economy led planners to recognize the
necessity of a coordinated system to facilitate the flow of travelers and
goods in the most convenient and efficient manner. This was certainly
no novel concern, for as early as 1936 the Senate had recommended a
Department of Transportation or, in the alternative, the consolidation of
all transportation programs in the Department of Commerce. In 1949
and again in 1961 congressional study groups recommended and promoted
coordinated programs to be concentrated in a Department of Transporta-
tion. It came as no surprise, then, when on 2 March 1966 President
Johnson presented to the House of Representatives a proposal for a
Cabinet-level Department of Transportation (DOT).
In order to augment such a department, it was recommended that almost
one hundred thousand government employees be brought together, along
with some six billion dollars of federal funds then annually devoted to
transportation. Such an assembly would include the Office of the Under
Secretary of Commerce for Transportation, the Bureau of Public Roads,
the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA), the Coast Guard, the Maritime
Administration, the safety functions of the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) and the Interstate Commerce Commission, along with numerous
inland shipping agencies. Thus, the Department of Transportation was
created to:
Coordinate the principal existing programs that promote transportation in
America; bring new technology to a total system, by promoting research
and development in cooperation with private industry; improve safety in
'Hearings on H.R. 13200 Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government
Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 House Hearings].
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every means of transportation; encourage private enterprise to take a full
and prompt advantage of new technological opportunities; encourage high-
quality, low-cost service to the public; conduct systems analyses and plan-
ning, to strengthen the weakest parts of today's system; and develop invest-
ment criteria and standards, and analytical techniques to assist all levels of
government and industry in their transportation investments.2
After lengthy and often hotly contested debates, at times resulting in
compromises,3 the Department of Transportation became a reality on 15
October 1966. The department began functioning on 1 April 1967. It
is the object of this comment to present an analysis of this new Cabinet-
level Department insofar as it will affect the aviation industry. Through
comparison with the advantages and shortcomings of the prior inde-
pendent agency system and upon consideration of the major objections
raised against the Department of Transportation Act, it may be possible
to come to an understanding of what the future will likely hold for
aviation within the DOT.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AVIATION
Although earlier air mail legislation marked the first instance of con-
gressional involvement with aviation, the legislative history of aviation
had its effective inception with the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, followed
by Reorganization Plans III and IV of 1940. Under this act, civil aviation
was administered by the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA), function-
ing as a division of the Cabinet-level Department of Commerce which
had many interests and responsibilities other than aviation. Suffering from
what has been called "stepchild" treatment, aviation witnessed a host of
problems, due mostly to the lack of an independent and coordinated
program.
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 created an administrative set-up
consisting of three groups: (1) the Civil Aeronautics Authority, which
exercised quasi-legislative functions concerning economic and safety reg-
ulations; (2) the Air Safety Board, which was to investigate accidents;
and (3) the Administrator, who performed executive functions such as
the development of air navigation facilities and promotional work.4 Two
problems with this organizational set-up emerged almost immediately.
First, the Air Safety Board's authority in regard to investigation proved
to be somewhat minimal because of the control exercised over the Board
by the Authority. "The Air Safety Board had the power to investigate
accidents, but no power to institute remedial measures. It could only
make recommendations to the five-member Authority [CAA]. The
Board's feeling of impotence was no doubt further accentuated by the
five-member Authority's proclivity to reach decisions before the Air Safety
Board could present its findings and recommendations."'
a 1966 House Hearings 42.
' See Part IV infra.
4 Hearings on S. 3010 Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government Opera-
tions, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 197 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Senate Hearings].
' 1966 Senate Hearings 198.
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Second, the dual CAA functions of (1) prescribing safety regulations
and (2) enforcing the same created a conflict of interest. Thus, by 1940,
both the Government and the industry maintained that the responsibility
for investigating accidents and maintaining a constant watch on air
safety should be separated from the function of regulating civil aero-
nautics.' The Reorganization Plan of 1940, then, was the congressional
adjustment to the problems created by the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938. The reorganization took the form of a transfer of the investigative,
rulemaking, and economic regulatory functions to a new agency, the
CAB; the responsibility for overseeing the CAB-created rules was to be
carried out by the Administrator. Thus, "no single agency or individual
was responsible for the regulation of air space ... , With the vast ex-
pansion of civil aviation after the Reorganization, it became apparent by
the mid-fifties that new legislation was needed to deal effectively with
the miriad of new problems confronting the CAA.
A. Federal Aviation Act of 1958
It remained for the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to create a framework
to discharge effectively the statutory duty of regulating and promoting
the aviation industry. The products of that Act, the FAA and CAB, be-
came two of the most efficient and best organized of all governmental
agencies. The objective of the Act was to reduce the diffusion of govern-
mental authority in the field of aviation, thereby strengthening and unify-
ing control of the national airspace,' and to regulate and administer matters
relating to safety in flight. The control, regulation, and administration
of the agency were vested in the Administrator of the FAA. The develop-
ment of safety regulations relating to the manufacture and operation of
aircraft and the certification of airmen, formerly within the purview of
the CAB under the 1938 Act, was also transferred to the Administrator.9
Likewise, the function of amending, modifying, suspending, or revoking
aircraft certificates was transferred to the Administrator.0 Included within
the principal functions assigned to the Administrator was the respon-
sibility for developing air traffic controls and regulations, administering
the air traffic control of civil and military aircraft within the United
States airspace, and operating related communication facilities and airport
traffic control towers."
'Id. at 201.
1966 House Hearings 419.
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 307, 72 Stat. 749, 49 U.S.C. § 1348 (1964). An article
appearing in 28 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 35 (1960) indicated that the principle purpose of the Act
was to create an independent agency (FAA) with authority to:
(1) establish, maintain and operate air navigation facilities, and provide for the
consoldiation of research and development of such facilities, (2) develop and operate
a common system of air traffic control and navigation for the safe and efficient use
of the airspace by both civil and military aircraft, (3) promulgate, administer and
enforce safety regulations for the manufacture, operation and flight of aircraft, and
(4) provide for the promotion, encouragement and development of civil aeronautics,
both in the United States and abroad.
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 601, 72 Stat. 775, 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (1964).
10Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 602, 72 Stat. 776, 49 U.S.C. § 1422 (1964).
" Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 307, 72 Star. 749, 49 U.S.C. § 1348 (1964).
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The Civil Aeronautics Board was continued under the provisions of
the 1958 Act as an independent agency, similar in organization to its
counterpart under the earlier act. However, the 1958 Act did change a
number of its functions. The responsibilities of the CAB were, generally,
twofold-economic regulation and safety. The Board was assigned the
specific task of issuing certificates of public convenience and necessity
and other permits authorizing commercial aircraft operations,"2 and the
more general responsibility of establishing aviation's economic policy. 3
In addition, the 1958 Act gave the Board exclusive authority to investi-
gate aviation accidents and to determine the probable cause thereof,.
a function which the Board's Bureau of Safety had performed since the
1940 Reorganization. In addition to accident investigation, the safety
function of the CAB under the 1958 Act also included the responsibility
for providing a de novo review of orders of the Administrator amending,
modifying, suspending, or revoking, in whole or in part, all types of
certificates, i.e., production certificates, airworthiness certificates, airman
certificates, air carrier operating certificates, air navigation facility certifi-
cates, and air agency certificates.1"
B. Conflicts Resulting From The 1958 Act
For the most part, the aviation team of the FAA and CAB was both
an organizational and a functional success. As a consequence, a great
deal of hesitancy was expressed by factions of the aviation industry con-
cerning the transfer of aviation functions to the DOT."e The Board had
demonstrated its ability, with few exceptions, to remain independent of
the FAA; however, those exceptions became an important part of the
impetus for the creation of the DOT.' Minus a team of competent traffic
control specialists, the Board accepted the results of the, FAA's self-
1 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401, 72 Stat. 754, as amended, 76 Stat. 143 (1962), 49
U.S.C. § 1371 (1964).
13Federal Aviation Act of 1958, S 102, 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1964) provides a
statement of the economic considerations the Board was directed to consider in the determination
of its economic policy. They include, among other things, the following:
(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation system properly
adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the
United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize and pre-
serve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in, such trans-
portation, and to improve the relations between, and coordinate transportation by,
air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers
at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages,
or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an
air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic
commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and
(f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil aeronautics.
14 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 701, 72 Stat. 781, as amended, by 76 Stat. 921 (1962),
49 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
isFederal Aviation Act of 1958, 5 609, 72 Stat. 779, 49 U.S.C. § 1429 (1964).
16 See Part IV, A infra.
" In the House hearings testimony was heard concerning an area involving a lack of func-
tional independence:
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investigation when air traffic control had a possible effect on an accident."
Moreover, when there was the possibility of air traffic control's having
precipitated an accident, the FAA's Bureau of Air Traffic Management
made an investigation of this aspect of the Administrator's responsibility.
Occasions arose in which the practice of allowing the FAA to investigate
itself produced unfortunate results. 9
Another conflict appeared in instances in which the certification and
licensing function of the FAA became an issue in an accident investiga-
tion. In August 1966 a Braniff Airway's BAC 111 broke-up in flight and
crashed near Omaha, Nebraska. A trade magazine carried the following
account of the conflict which developed between the two agencies:
Disagreement between staff members of the Civil Aeronautics Board's
Bureau of Safety and the Federal Aviation Agency over the conduct of an
investigation of the crash of a Braniff BAC 111 points up a possible sore
spot in the organization of the new Department of Transportation ...
FAA staff members were disturbed by CAB's handling of the report by
the engineering group of the accident investigation team. The report indi-
cated by implication a possible need for more stringent certification regula-
tions of T-tail jet aircraft, an FAA function.'
One explanation of the lack of difficulty with which these two aviation
agencies have generally functioned in conjunction with each other may
lie in the fact that their responsibilities were, for the most part, separate,
so that there was little opportunity for conflict. Only in the instances in
which their responsibilities over-lapped did these difficulties arise. Thus,
objections to the consolidation of all aviation functions in the Department
of Transportation, which will be discussed at a later point,"' seem possibly
to have been well taken.
III. THE ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECT OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION ON AVIATION
Almost all areas of aviation will feel the effect of the Department of
Transportation, if only indirectly. The new Department cuts across
the broad functions of the traditional independent agency system by
establishing many new administrative units in the place of the old sys-
tem, with each unit having efficiency and coordination as primary objec-
tives. Unlike the agency system, these new functional units will in many
cases have to deal with all facets of the transportation industry rather
than with aviation alone.
"As more and more airspace is placed under positive control, and more and more aircraft rely
upon FAA's air traffic control system for navigation and separation from other aircraft, there has
naturally arisen a greater possibility of involvement of the air traffic control system in aviation
accidents." 1966 House Hearings 408.
"SSee generally Note, 30 J. AIR L. & CoM. 281 (1964) for a discussion of this functional
conflict.
"See Part IV, C infra.
2"Aviation Week & Space Technology, 19 Dec. 1966, p. 34.
" See Part IV, A infra.
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A. Federal Aviation Agency
All of the personnel and functions of the Federal Aviation Agency have
been transferred to and vested in the Secretary of the new Department.2
It will lose its independent status and will henceforth be termed the
Federal Aviation Administration, an "Operating Agency"2 no longer
reporting directly to the President but to the Secretary instead." General
and coordinated operational policies for the entire Department will be
formulated at the secretarial level, while the Operating Agencies will be
responsible for the development of day-to-day policy."
B. Civil Aeronautics Board
In contrast to the unit treatment afforded the FAA, the functions of
the CAB have been fragmented by the creation of the new Department.
Stated simply, the CAB will remain as an independent agency, retaining
only its economic regulatory responsibilities, including the issuance of
certificates of public convenience and necessity, while all of the Board's
safety functions have been transferred to the Secretary.'
2 Department of Transportation Act, § 6(c) (1), 80 Stat. 938 (1966).
' An "Operating Agency" is an operating arm, the purpose of which is to carry out the func-
tions of the Department. The FAA, the Coast Guard and other organizations are in the group.
2' General William F. McKee, Administrator of the FAA, discussed the form the FAA will take
after it is transferred to the DOT. "The agency will remain intact pretty much as it now is,
and that the duties now performed by the agency, while under the bill transferred to the Secretary,
would be redelegated . . . to the agency. 1966 Senate Hearings 253.
215 1966 Senate Hearings 702.
26 Department of Transportation Act, § 6(d), 80 Stat. 938 (1966). The following table com-
pares the procedures of the old and new accident investigation systems:
Steps Aviation (CAB/FAA) Department of Transportation
Notice of accident received by
CAB Bureau of Safety.
Investigation initiated by Bureau
investigators.
Field investigation under CAB
direction (in all fatal or large
aircraft accidents) includes
teams specializing in structures,
powerplants, etc.
All other accidents investigated
by FAA under authority dele-
gated by CAB. (CAB, 901 ac-
cidents; FAA, 4540 accidents
investigated in 1965.)
Product of investigation, includ-
ing team reports, laboratory
analysis, etc. assembled.
CAB formal accident hearing (6
in 1965) with CAB member
chairman. Receives product of
investigation and additional
testimony. (This step omitted
in small aircraft and nonfatal
accidents.)
Notice of accident reported to
appropriate element of DOT.
Safety staff initiates an investiga-
tion.
Safety staff element supervises in-
vestigation.
Product of investigation is as-
sembled for further disposition.
Formal hearings will be held in the
same circumstances as they are
held under present law and pro-
cedure in agencies whose func-
tions are being transferred.
NTSB member would preside in
major air accident investigative
hearings and might participate
in hearings involving marine,
rail and highway accidents.
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The responsibility of aviation accident investigation, although trans-
ferred to the Secretary, has been delegated to the National Transportation
Safety Board. The entire investigative staff of the CAB's Bureau of
Safety has been transferred to this organization, where the personnel of
the old Bureau will continue to function as a unit. The actual investiga-
tion function of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is
limited to the performance of aviation accident investigation, and because
it is believed that aviation accident investigators can make valuable im-
provements in the accident investigation programs of other modes of
transportation, the NTSB will also recommend to other operating com-
ponents investigative techniques of proven worth. The purpose of the sep-
aration of the accident investigation function from the operating units
of the Department is that of ensuring an entirely independent operation."
The original recommendation of the Department's planners was that the
function of aviation accident investigation should repose in the NTSB;
however, upon the insistence of certain elements of the aviation industry,
the House of Representatives agreed to amend the Administration's orig-
inal version of the bill by creating an Office of Accident Investigation,
to be a staff office of the Secretary, in order to discharge this responsibil-
ity. It was believed that this amendment would retain the desirable checks
6. Record .------------------ Record of hearings, with exhibits,
transmitted to Bureau of Safe-
ty.
7. Record completed-. Bureau of Safety completes rec-
ord by adding technical data
or reports or other information
required.
8. Evaluation ------- Bureau of Safety prepares pro-
posed findings and evaluates
information of record.
9. Report - Report, including all evidence
proposed findings prepared by
Bureau of Safety, sent to full
CAB.
10. Determination rec- Determination of probable cause
ommendation. issued by CAB. Recommenda-
tions made to appropriate agen-
cies.
1966 Senate Hearings 270.
Record, or other product of inves-
tigation, transmitted to appro-
priate element of DOT. NTSB
regulations will provide for the
manner in which reports of
formal hearings will be prepared
and handled in proceeding in
which the Board participates.
Record, or other product of inves-
tigation, completed in appropri-
ate element of DOT.
Appropriate element evaluates rec-
ord or other product and pre-
pares and/or reviews tentative
findings.
Report, containing record, other
products of investigation, and
tentative findings sent to NTSB.
NTSB regulations will cover
procedures where NTSB mem-
ber presides at investigative
hearings as in major aviation ac-
cident cases. NTSB will be able
to require further investigation
in situations where other infor-
mation is needed to supplement
or support record prepared at
investigative hearing as well as
any other information needed by
the Board for the conduct of
its functions.
Cause or probable cause determined
by NTSB.
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and balances present in the previous agency system and would provide for
the "unique" needs of aviation.
When the Senate considered the legislation, this particular aspect of the
bill was subject to considerable debate. Ultimately the Senate version
abolished the Office of Accident Investigation under the Secretary and
transferred the accident investigation function, formerly reposing in the
CAB, to the National Transportation Safety Board. Obviously, it was
necessary to refer the bill to a conference committee. Although a number
of compromises were made in the conference committee, the Senate ver-
sion concerning aircraft accident investigation prevailed and was ultimate-
ly signed into law by the President.
C. National Transportation Safety Board
Section 5 (a) of the Act provides for the establishment of a National
Transportation Safety Board, consisting of five members appointed by the
President by and with the consent of the Senate. They may be removed
only by the President, and then only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office.2" "[T]he Board shall be independent of the Secretary
and the other offices and officers of the Department . . .[and] shall report
to the Congress annually . *.. .29 The enactment vests in the NTSB, rather
than in the Secretary, various functions, powers, and duties with respect to:
(1) determining the cause or probable cause of transportation accidents
and reporting the facts, conditions, and circumstances relating to such acci-
dents; and
(2) reviewing on appeal the suspension, amendment, modification, revoca-
tion, or denial of any certificate or license by the Secretary or by an
Administrator."
The Board will operate with a limited staff. In order to achieve its ulti-
mate objective of translating the findings of accident investigations into
means for accident prevention, the Board is authorized to make recom-
mendations to the Secretary for the conduct of special studies pertaining
to safety in transportation. Thus, the former CAB functions of investigat-
ing aviation accidents, determining the probable cause of such accidents,
and passing on review of certification and licensing decisions of the FAA
have been transferred to the NTSB.
D. The Independent Agencies
The economic regulatory agencies are excluded from the new Depart-
ment. Little testimony was heard on this facet of the bill; however, Fred-
erick B. Lee, Director of the National Pilots Association, seemed to speak
for the aviation industry when he agreed that the merger of all transpor-
tation regulatory agencies, including air transportation, in the new De-
partment would be the "kiss of death."31 In retrospect, the exclusion of
28Department of Transportation Act, § 5(h), 80 Stat. 936 (1966).
28Departemnt of Transportation Act, S 5(f) and (g), 80 Stat. 936 (1966).
'o Department of Transportation Act, § 5 (b), 80 Stat. 936 (1966).
a' 1966 House Hearings 213.
1967]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
these regulatory agencies seems to be the result of a number of considera-
tions, two of which could have been the appeasement of an industry which
took issue on many other points and an attempt to ensure the continuance
of a system of checks and balances, a matter heavily attacked in other
areas. The functional and policy impact which the economic regulatory
agencies will have upon the objectives of the Department will be taken up
at a later point. 2
IV. THE ACT: AREAS OF DISCONTENT AND
POSSIBLE CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS
In construing legislation, the rule that "the intention of the law-maker
constitutes the law" 3 has been applied repeatedly. Through studying the
testimony before the congressional committees, one may discover the areas
of disagreement and potential conflicts in interest which are inherent in
the new bill.
A. Aviation Is "Unique"
In general, the group which favored passage of the contested provisions
of the bill represented the Administration, while the antagonistic group
normally represented the views of private aviation. One faction maintained
that all of aviation should be excluded from the DOT. Representatives
of this group maintained that "the problems of aviation are so unique and
extraordinary that it is essential that there be a separate agency of the
Federal Government to deal with this industry that is changing so rap-
idly."34 Joseph B. Hartranft, Jr., President of the Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association (AOPA), stated his organization's position when he
testified, "[T]he diversity of interests that must be served by such a secre-
tary [of the DOT] could well reduce the effectiveness and blunt the initi-
ative of those attempting to discharge the will of Congress in the aviation
field."" It was suggested that aviation could be brought under the Depart-
ment at some future date when experience with the system dictates that
such a transfer would be in the public interest." The general position of
these diverse groups was voiced by the AOPA in the following manner:
Aviation is now the most progressive and dynamic transportation mode. Its
vitality will only be enfeebled, its momentum slowed, its unique benefits de-
ferred by amalgomating [sic] it with the other modes in an organizational
structure devised for administrative convenience on the theory that they are
all transportation. They are; but it would be like hitching a race horse, a
quarter-horse, a Shetland pony and a Clydesdale into a team-they are all
horses, but they don't work well as a team and there is little merit in trying
to make one out of them.
The belief that "aviation with its unique problems of growth and rapid
3' See Part IV, F infra.
33 Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 176 (1871).
'1966 Senate Hearings 288.
35 1966 House Hearings 345.
aId. at 373.
17 1966 Senate Hearings 323.
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technological changes should be a separate agency with the Administrator
reporting directly to the President of the United States""s illustrates the
fear that inclusion of aviation in a monolithic transportation agency
would result in a return to the pre-1958 neglect and indifference which
plagued aviation under the Department of Commerce." Having extricated
itself from that painful position, and after several years of independent
and productive growth, elements of the industry had no desire to return
to the type of frustrating conditions witnessed in the fifties. They en-
visioned this possibility with aviation under the aegis of the Department
of Transportation.
Although the fear expressed by these elements of the aviation industry
may be appreciated, one finds it difficult to come to the same conclusions
when the objectives of the Department are considered in light of present
circumstances. Commenting on the objection to the inclusion of aviation
within the Department on the ground that it is somehow "unique," the
Senate Committee declared, "To leave outside of the Secretary's respon-
sibility one of the most significant areas of Federal activity, would only
continue the diffusion which the creation of the DOT is intended to
overcome." It was urged that any attempt at a unified transportation
policy would be made impractical without the inclusion of this all-im-
portant aspect of the industry. Moreover, aviation is no longer in the posi-
tion of a fledgling industry, easily injured in competition with other as-
pects of the economy. Najeeb E. Halaby, presently Senior Vice-president
of Pan American World Airways, and past Administrator of the FAA,
pointed out that now, ten years after aviation's experience with the De-
partment of Commerce, there is a completely different environment.
Agreeing that he would oppose aviation's return to the Department of
Commerce, Halaby was quick to point out:
We are talking about a Department of Transportation . . . a Department
whose Secretary's sole concern would be the advancement of the Nation's
total transportation system and the efficient administration of the Federal
programs relating to transportation services and safety. The FAA, as the
largest component in terms of manpower, would certainly be a highly in-
fluential element of the Department of Transportation. The Secretary would
need to exercise special care to avoid disrupting its delicate and critical
functions, particularly those relating to the control of air traffic, safety
standards and the support of the national defense.4'
In sum, it certainly appears possible that the retention of the indepen-
dent status of the FAA and the CAB's safety functions would have de-
feated the purpose of the DOT, and it is doubtful that their inclusion in
the DOT will inhibit the continued growth of the industry.
aS Id. at 290.
"'Id. at 406. The fear was expressed by Clifford P. Burton, Executive Director, Air Traffic
Control Association (ATCA), that a transfer of aviation into a large, bureaucratic department
would amount to a return to a time prior to the 1958 Act when aviation was buried in the "'base-
ment" of the Department of Commerce, where the many other interests and responsibilities of
the parent department stiffled the growth of aviation.
" 1966 Senate Hearings 740.
4 11d. at 514.
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B. The Safety Function
No area of the draft recommendation of the Department's planners
underwent a more intensive attack than those provisions providing for the
transfer of the whole of aviation safety to the new Department. Opponents
of the transfer pointed to the fact that the CAB's Bureau of Safety had
built-up over a number of years the enviable reputation of being one of
the most competent organizations in this nation's government. They sug-
gested that it would be unwise to disrupt a "winning team" by placing
the responsibility for aviation safety in the NTSB, along with all modes
of transportation, as was originally suggested by the President and the
Department's planners.
Under Title VII of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the CAB was
given the responsibility of investigating all accidents involving civilian
aircraft, determining the probable cause of such accidents, recommending
to the Administrator of the FAA measures designed to prevent similar
accidents, making public all reports deemed by it to be in the public inter-
est, and conducting special studies and investigations to reduce the num-
ber of accidents. "' Under Title VI, the CAB performed another very im-
portant function, i.e., that of providing an independent de novo review
of action taken by the FAA in denying, suspending, or revoking safety
licenses, airworthiness certificates, air carrier operating certificates, and air
agency certificates. '
Objections to the inclusion of aviation safety in the Department were
in part seemingly well founded. Frank M. McDermott, a transportation
consultant whose testimony supported the Department as a whole, voiced
a strong objection to the proposed inclusion of the aviation safety respon-
sibility in the Department. It was his contention that the complexity of
aviation accident investigation demanded the continuation of the CAB's
Bureau of Safety in an environment completely independent of the De-
partment of Transportation. Mr. McDermott outlined several factors
which he believed required separate treatment of aviation accident in-
vestigation:
(1) Aviation utilizes a third dimension which introduces a complexity
almost beyond comprehension in terms of attempting to reconstruct the acci-
dent.
(2) There is far greater reliance upon electronics in aviation, as well as
reliance upon other parties such as air traffic controllers, or pilots of other
aircraft.
4 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 701-03, 72 Stat. 781-82, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1441-43 (1964).
1966 House Hearings 130-31 dealt with the functions of the CAB under the 1958 Act. The Bureau
of Safety performed the CAB's staff responsibility of investigating accidents and aided the Board
in determining their probable cause. The Bureau was comprised of "176 employees, accounting for
21 percent of the Board's employees and 26 percent of its budget, with 69 employees being located
in 10 field offices throughout the continental United States." In "the fiscal year 1965 the Bureau
conducted 933 investigations and analyzed 5,014 investigative reports. There were 92 accidents in-
volving air carrier aircraft, of which 11 involved fatalities, and approximately 5,100 accidents in
general aviation, with 513 involving fatalities."
4Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 602(b), 72 Stat. 776, 49 U.S.C. § 1422 (1964).
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(3) There is the self-evident but complete inability to "stop" in mid-air.
This feature alone tends to avoid many accidents on the ground."
Opponents of the DOT expressed the further apprehension that the
procedural safeguards of the independent agency system would be lost in
the new Department. Under the 1958 Act, the FAA function of estab-
lishing aviation regulations was detached from the CAB functions of
accident investigation and determination of probable cause. Likewise, the
responsibility for ruling on licenses and certificates was subject to review
by a separate agency, the CAB. It was contended that these procedural
safeguards could not be guaranteed in a single monolithic agency which
controlled all transportation, for the Department would often be placed
in the position of judging its own actions, i.e., those of its "Operating
Agencies."
The desirability of separation of interests was first recognized in the
1938 legislation. It was decided then that an agency could not reasonably
be expected, in investigating an accident and determining its probable
cause, to criticize its own efficiency in performing its regulatory duties or
in installing, operating, or maintaining air navigation facilities.45 As a
result, safeguards were incorporated in the Civil Aeronautics Act, as
well as in the 1958 Act, to prevent a conflict between the two functions.
William K. Lawton, Executive Director of the National Business Air-
craft Association, represented his organization's views on the problem of
checks and balances when he stated, "While the Board [NTSB] is made
independent of the Secretary by the bill's statement that 'In exercising
these functions, powers and duties the Board shall be independent of the
Secretary, and the operating units of the Department,' we feel appeals
[taken from rulings on certificate and license applications] would actually
be directed to the same jury which passed the original sentence."" Expres-
sing the same view but more simply, Charles H. Ruby, President of the
Air Line Pilots Asociation, pointed out that "the airman will be accused
by the Department of Transportation and will receive his first and last
hearing by the Department of Transportation. Desirable checks and bal-
ances are lost." 4
4 1966 House Hearings 405.
45 1966 Senate Hearings 197.
46Id. at 373.
41 1966 House Hearings 376. Frederick B. Lee stated the position of NPA when he said "[W]e
feel that it is unwise to have such a Board [NTSB] with its power to review of certificate action
operating within the Department. We do not feel it is proper that any board, no matter what
mechanism was used to insure its 'independence,' could ever be wholly objective in an accident
investigation in which their department or agency was involved." 1966 House Hearings 211. Gen-
erally, this was an objection well taken, for no other mandate of our governmental system is more
basic than that of the requirement of checks and balances. These fears were reiterated before the
Senate by the representative of the NBAA:
Again, this association urges that as the committee and the Congress continue into their
examination of the proposed Senate bill 3010 that the committee and Congress vigorously
assert that any accident investigating body and any quasi-judicial appeal or review function
must and shall be completely divorced from any semblance of direct or indirect control ex-
ercised by any other governmental agencies or departments. An accident investigation body
and any appeal function must have the status of an independent office. 1966 Senate Hearings
373.
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In countering the arguments that checks and balances will be lost in
a monolithic department and that the safety functions performed by the
FAA and CAB are so unique as to make it impractical to include them in
a department with all other modes of transportation, the Administration
first pointed out that the system would be incomplete without the inclu-
sion of an operational aspect as important as safety. It was reasoned that
"accidents in various forms of transportation have many common ele-
ments ... [and], since so many elements are involved, there will be a
greater opportunity to improve investigative techniques and procedures
by applying the lessons learned in one mode to problems in another."" The
benefits of such an inclusion of aviation safety in a coordinated forum were
detailed in a Staff Memorandum before the Senate:
The transfer of the CAB accident investigation functions to the Depart-
ment and the determination of probable cause and appellate functions to the
NTSB will have several advantages. Bringing aviation safety into closer
association with other forms of safety activities will encourage a greater
research into the many common elements of transportation safety. Increased
research and the application of research findings in such common areas as
human factors, i.e. fatigue, psychological [sic] stability, etc., and material
and structural performance will be made easier and more complete by focus-
ing transportation safety responsibility in a single agency. "
It was agreed that determining probable cause in today's highly tech-
nological environment and performing the function of a review board both
require extensive and detailed inquiry. In order to discharge these respon-
sibilities effectively, there must be complete freedom from the distracting,
partisan, or proprietary influences so often present when probable cause
must be determined by the same body that is responsible for operations,
rulemaking, surveillance, or investigation." In answering complaints con-
cerning the inclusion of the FAA and the safety functions of the CAB in
the DOT, Congress expressed the belief that there would be no lack of in-
dependence of functions in the new Department. The members of the
NTSB are to be appointed by the President and, thus, are entirely inde-
pendent of the Secretary. The NTSB, then, was included in the DOT pri-
marily for housekeeping purposes, and has the power to require the De-
partment to carry out investigations and to do other related work. It was
the belief of Congress that it would be a mistake to create the NTSB as an
entity completely separate from the Department, for this would create an-
other agency exercising transportation-safety functions. The opinion was
expressed that a separate Board would be much more costly and, in fact,
less effective than the proposed system. 1
Moreover, the proponents of aviation inclusion pointed out that safety
can no longer be an "incidental" function of a governmental agency, that
the formation of the NTSB brings about the creation of a single body
48 1966 Senate Hearings 184.491d. at 741.50Id. at 185.
5 H.R. REP. No. 1701, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1966).
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concerned solely with this all-important function. The NTSB, it was
argued, would make possible a coordination of this function and the de-
velopment of a higher degree of expertise, while promoting the more
efficient performance of the principle function of the CAB.
The transfer of this activity will also free the CAB from a significant work-
load item and enable the members to devote greater effort to their primary
function, that of economic regulation. On the other hand, the NTSB will
have the necessary independence in performing its quasi-judicial functions,
while its members will be able to devote full time to furthering transporta-
tion safety activities.2
Thus, the Administration refuted the arguments of the opponents of the
bill by merely reaching the opposite conclusions, i.e., that checks and bal-
ances will not be lost and that air safety can be adequately provided for in
the DOT. Moreover, "no particular gain could follow from leaving any
one mode of transportation to the supervision of other agencies of the
government. To do so would be to destroy the very possibility of benefits
in improvement and coordination that the Department is being organized
to achieve.""8
C. The Aviation Accident Investigation Function
The hearings before both houses of Congress and the final activity in
conference committee clearly indicate that the question of aviation acci-
dent investigation was one not easily solved. Those passing in judgment
upon the merits and organizational structure of the bill were faced time
and again with the argument that aviation, and particularly its need in the
area of safety, is "unique" and requires special treatment apart from that
afforded other aspects of the transportation industry. This argument and
the fear expressed by some elements of the aviation industry that without
separate treatment valuable checks and balances could not be guaranteed
must have made a considerable impression, because a House amendment
brought about the formation of the short-lived plan for an Office of
Accident Investigation. Aviation accident investigation was to have been
the sole responsibility of this organization and it was to have been
separately placed within the structure of the Department. After the Sen-
ate's consideration of the bill and a resulting conference committee, the
function came to its present resting place within the NTSB. The personnel
of the CAB's Bureau of Safety have been transferred as a unit to this in-
dependent board where they will continue to discharge the responsibility
of aviation accident investigation.
Alan S. Boyd, the recently-appointed Secretary of the Department of
Transportation, was asked if he believed that the final placement of this
important aspect of aviation safety would be agreeable to previously ob-
jecting elements of the aviation industry. Although agreeing that factions
such as the Air Transport Association (ATA) would continue to oppose
52 1966 Senate Hearings 741.
5id. at 185.
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any attempt to remove the CAB's safety function, the Secretary expressed
his belief that not all members of the industry, or even all members of the
ATA, joined in ATA's disapproval of the Department and that such a so-
lution should satisfy most objections. " Responding to the same question,
William F. McKee, Administrator of the FAA, stated that his agency
would operate with no difficulty either way, i.e., with the safety function
solely in the NTSB or performed by the Office of Accident Investigation.
He stated, "As we understand it, regardless of where it [the safety func-
tion] goes in the Department of Transportation, it will still be done sep-
arately and independently from the FAA and we subscribe to that prin-
ciple. 
5 5
Despite the optimistic statements of these key administrators, it is
doubtful that immediate satisfaction among all elements of the aviation
industry will result from the placement of this function in the NTSB.
Frank M. McDermott expressed his disapproval of any transfer of safety
functions and recommended that "the aviation safety and accident inves-
tigation functions relating to aviation should remain with the Civil Aero-
nautics Board, and that the CAB be provided with such resources, facilities,
and manpower as to be completely independent of the Department of
Transportation in this regard."' As an example of the conflict he feared, he
cited an accident which occurred in December 1960, wherein two airliners
collided over New York City. Both of these flights were operating under
the air traffic control system of the FAA under instrument conditions. The
Bureau of Air Traffic Management of the FAA, responsible for the opera-
tion of all air traffic control facilities, conducted an investigation of its
own operation and produced the following findings:
Air Traffic Control procedures did not contribute to the cause of the ac-
cident.
Air Traffic Control personnel operated in accordance with established pro-
cedures and were not negligent in any performance which could be related
to the cause of the accident."?
The CAB accident investigation produced the following probable cause:
" 'The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was that
United Flight 826 proceeded beyond its clearance limit and the confines of
airspace allocated to the flight by Air Traffic Control.' .... And yet, spread
clearly through the record of the hundred-plus suits filed against the two
airlines and the federal government was the fact that the mid-air collision
occured because air traffic control lost track of one radar target and
"He stated:
[T]here are some of them [members of the aviation industry] who are quite satisfied
with what has been proposed, particularly in view of the amendment . . . which pro-
vides that the Office of Accident Investigation shall be separate from the Federal
Aviation Administration. Their concern as I understand it, and I can't say I am
speaking for them, but their concern was that you have the FAA investigating itself,
and this has been taken care of. 1966 Senate Hearings 694.
55 1966 House Hearings 138.
11 Id. at 409.
5' 1966 Senate Hearings 584.
5' Ibid.
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confused it with another." Mr. McDermott contended, then, that there
was not sufficient separation of functions between the former CAB and
FAA, and that should the functions of the two agencies be transferred to
one monolithic department, checks and balances would a fortiori be lack-
ing.
D. General Aviation
General aviation is growing faster than any other segment of the in-
dustry. The active fleet of general aviation aircraft now numbers approxi-
mately 100,000 planes, with more than 12,000 new aircraft being manu-
factured annually. These aircraft are flown by more than 400,000 pilots
for personal transportation, business, and recreational purposes. In com-
parison, the fleet of commercial aircraft numbers slightly more than 2,000
planes."5 Due to this disparity in numbers and the history of commercial
aviation's impact upon general aviation, representatives of general aviation
fear that as a result of the new Department, general aviation has been
"tied to the tail of the commercial carrier's kites," insofar as receiving
funds for airports, air traffic control, and the supporting services is con-
cerned.E The new Act makes no specific provision for general aviation, so
it can only be anticipated that the Federal Aviation Administration, func-
tioning as an Operating Agency in the new Department, will continue to
have a great impact upon this aspect of aviation. Hence, general aviation's
fear that the protection once enjoyed in the checks and balances of the
CAB review function will be lost in the NTSB is understandable. It is sub-
mitted that the complaint of general aviation has some merit, not neces-
sarily because of the possible injury due to the dominance of commercial
aviation, but because of the basic premise upon which the Department is
built-coordination. General aviation comprises a large and formidable
portion of the aviation industry, and for the same reason that aviation, as a
whole, should not be excluded from the Department, general aviation
should be specifically provided for. The shortcoming is not that present
treatment is inadequate, rather special organizational precautions must
be taken in order to ensure continued and successful growth of this im-
portant arm of aviation. If this is not done now it will surely have to be
done at a later date, after the Department suffers functional set-backs due
Frank McDermott pointed out that:
[The] FAA, given the opportunity to investigate its own actions, did what perhaps
any agency would do under similar circumstances; they reported a clean bill of
health. The Civil Aeronautics Board, hampered by an inadequate staff (actually only
one low-grade employee with background in air traffic control) was compelled to
accept FAA's findings with respect to the air traffic control aspects of the investiga-
tion. The real cause was not disclosed until the depositions were ordered by the Court,
at which time the Department of Justice offered to settle for 24%.
The hazard inherent in such a situation is apparent. If an agency is allowed to
investigate its own operation, or even if it is allowed to exert any influence over the
investigating agency, the chance of correcting any embarrassing deficiencies is con-
siderably lessened. 1966 Senate Hearings 585.
60 1966 House Hearings 349.
1 William K. Lawton represented NBAA, as well as all of general aviation, when he expressed
the feeling that "we foresee in this Department of Transportation a regression from the recently
arrived status for general aviation, the largest operation of aircraft in the world ....... 1966
House Hearings 227.
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to its absence. The countering argument is that the existing system is ade-
quate, that it has performed the task well in the past, and that it will con-
tinue to do so. However, in view of the increasing importance of this as-
pect of transportation, perhaps such an excellent opportunity as this
should have been utilized in order to guarantee its continued advance.
E. Regulatory Agencies
"One of the aims of the Department is to correlate the policies of all
transportation functions of the Federal Government. If the regulator
[sic] functions of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Civil Aero-
nautics Board, and the Federal Maritime Commission remain outside the
Department of Transportation, we do not see how effective control and
policymaking over all transportation in the United States can be
achieved." ' This opinion expressed by Frederick B. Lee, representing the
National Pilot's Association, brings out what appears to be the most ser-
ious shortcoming of the new Act. There was not a great deal of discus-
sion on this issue for no party with a particular interest in pressing the
objection appeared before the hearings. Section 4 (a) of the act creating the
DOT provides that the Secretary shall, among other things, develop na-
tional transportation policies and programs, and make recommendations for
their implementation." The economic regulatory functions lodged in the
CAB are not affected by the creation of the Department. Hence, the CAB
is not bound by policies promulgated by the Secretary when the Board
makes its determinations of public interest and public convenience and
necessity for the development of aviation policy." The position of the
CAB on this matter was set forth in a prepared statement presented be-
fore the Senate committee by Charles S. Murphy, Chairman of the Civil
Aeronautics Board, which provided, in part:
It seems clear that section 4(a) does not obligate the Civil Aeronautics
Board to implement the national transportation policies and programs devel-
oped by the Secretary in exercising its economic regulatory functions under
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Rather, insofar as the Board is concerned,
the provision provides a basis upon which the Secretary may make recom-
mendations to the Board concerning aviation matters ....
In sum, it is believed that enactment of section 4(a) would place the
Secretary of Transportation in the same position with respect to Board pro-
ceedings as that presently occupied by other departments and agencies of
the Government concerned with aviation matters or administering programs
which may be affected by the Board determinations. Under established prin-
ciples, a regulatory agency such as the Board considers the views and recom-
mendations of other governmental components having responsibilities in re-
lated areas, and the normal method by which such consideration is afforded
is by the participation of these other agencies in the regulatory proceedings."
In connection with the granting of subsidies' the President in his message
62 1966 House Hearings 211.
"'Department of Transportation Act, § 4(a), 80 Stat. 933 (1966).
"See Part II, A supra.
" 1966 Senate Hearings 244.
'"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 406, 72 Stat. 763 (1958), as amended (1962), 49 U.S.C.
5 1376 (1964).
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proposing the Department of Transportation expressed the contrasting
view that "the subsidy program will be coordinated with overall national
transportation policy." ' The opinion of the CAB concerning this aspect
of its function, as it will be affected by the DOT, was also set forth in the
Board's position paper as follows:
Section 8 (a) of the bill amends section 406(b) of the Federal Aviation
Act so as to provide that in administering the subsidy program, the Board
shall take into consideration the standards and criteria prescribed by the
Secretary of Transportation for determining the character and quality of
transportation required for the commerce of the United States and the na-
tional defense.
This amendment is believed merely to embody the principles heretofore
mentioned [elsewhere in the position paper] which require regulatory agencies
to take into account the recommendations of other interested departments of
Government and not to require the Board to apply the standards and criteria
prescribed by the Secretary in administering the aviation subsidy program."8
It appears, therefore, that irreconcilable conflicts may well arise out of
the present organizational set-up, all to the definite detriment of the De-
partment of Transportation. However, a recent article 9 co-authored by
Howard C. Westwood and Alexander E. Bennett presented a favorable
forecast of the relation of CAB policymaking to that of the Department."
Westwood and Bennett contend that the Secretary will have some influ-
ence upon CAB policies.
Although one may hope that the CAB will be able to rise above its
vested interest in aviation, as opposed to transportation as a whole, this
possibility seems rather remote. It is noteworthy that the CAB has often
demonstrated a proclivity against cooperating with other modes of trans-
portation if an interest beneficial to aviation was at stake.
It is difficult to believe that the CAB, in carrying out its economic
functions, will not have a profound effect upon any attempt by the DOT
to establish an industry-wide transportation policy. This effect may be
readily appreciated by considering the "public interest" guidelines estab-
lished for the CAB in carrying out its economic regulatory functions.
Among the matters to be considered as being "in the public interest" are:
the encouragement and development of an air transport system," the reg-
ulation of that system in a manner that recognizes its inherent advantages
and that fosters sound economic conditions, ' the promotion of adequate,
efficient service at reasonable rates without unjust discriminations or un-
fair or destructive competitive practices,3 competition to the extent nec-
07 1966 House Hearings 41.
68 1966 Senate Hearings 245.
09 Westwood & Bennett, A Footnote to the Legislative History of the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938 and Afterward, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 309 (1967).
70 Id. at 362. It was urged that, "the Secretary of Transportation will be in a position to repre-
sent the executive view on transportation as a whole, which might take into account the various,
occasionally conflicting, views of different departments, and which, in any case, may 'provide
general leadership in the identification and solution of transportation problems.'
71Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 102(a), 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1964).
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 102(b), 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (1964).
"'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 102(c), 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (1964).
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essary for the sound development of the industry,"4 safety," and the pro-
motion of aeronautics in general."
The CAB has authority to approve combinations with different modes
of transportation"' but history has indicated a failure to do so in the
majority of instances, preferring instead to protect its own interests."M The
Board discharges and shall continue to discharge its responsibilities under a
dual mandate: to regulate and to promote aviation."9 Because the CAB has
the primary responsibility of developing aviation policy through economic
regulation, the Board's first allegiance will be to aviation. It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that conflicts of interest may well develop between the
CAB, in its attempt to discharge its legislatively-designated responsibility,
and the comprehensive transportation policies formulated by the Secretary.
Thus, it may not be possible for the Secretary to establish policies cover-
ing the entire spectrum of transportation with any expectation of effective
success. Moreover, the problem which the Department will likely experi-
ence with the CAB may be only minor in comparison with those brought
about by the more powerful Interstate Commerce Commission, which has
also been excluded from the DOT.
It remains to be seen whether the apparent problem of CAB interfer-
ence with the national transportation policy will materialize. Perhaps the
cooperation of the CAB will be brought about through an exertion of pres-
sure on the part of the Executive. One opportunity for such an exertion
could arise from the fact that the importance of international carriage has
grown immensely. The Board's international route decisions affecting both
foreign and United States carriers have been subject to Presidential ap-
proval since 1938."8 It has been asserted, "Were the Executive, through the
Secretary of Transportation, to participate extensively in the Board's own
proceedings [concerning foreign and domestic carrier certification in in-
ternational carriage] before the Board arrives at its recommendation to the
President, it could be questioned whether the Board would retain any func-
tion of substantial significance."8' Such a practice would possibly bring
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 102(d), 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302(d) (1964).
"SFederal Aviation Act of 1958, S 102(e), 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302(e) (1964).
7Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 102(f), 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302(f) (1964).
"Continental So. Lines v. CAB, 197 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 831 (1952);
Pan Am. Airways Co. v. CAB, 121 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1941).
7" On occasions affiliation of air and sea carriers has been approved, but the CAB has more fre-
quently disapproved such alliances. Northwest Airlines-Am. President Lines Agreement, 9 C.A.B.
336 (1948); American President Lines Petition, 7 C.A.B. 799 (1947). Railway express has been
permitted by the CAB to conduct some indirect air carriage traffic, but the Board has more often
forbidden the entry by railroad-affiliated forwarders into air carriage. National Air Freight For-
warding Corp. v. CAB, 197 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Air Freight Forwarder, 11 C.A.B. 182
(1949). There seems to have been an apprehension that these carriers would have a competitive
advantage over forwarders offering only air carriage. Affiliation seems to have been permitted more
frequently with motor carriers. Consolidated Air Freight, Interlocking Relationships, 20 C.A.B.
740 (1955); Braungart, Interlocking Relationships, 19 C.A.B. 456 (1954). Thus, the history of
CAB operations seems to establish the understandable tendency to favor benefiting aviation over
coordinating and cooperating with other modes of transportation for the benefit of the entire
transportation industry.
7"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 102, 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1964).
"Civil Aeronautics Act, § 801, as amended, 72 Stat. 798, 49 U.S.C. § 1508 (1964).
" See Westwood & Bennett, supra note 69.
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about results similar to those experienced in the post 1938 era when the
Civil Aeronautics Authority suppressed the effectiveness of the Air Safety
Board.82 It should be pointed out, however, that while such route decisions
are subject to the approval of the President, it might be difficult to bring
much pressure to bear upon the Board through this means for the CAB
would continue to make its own decisions, whatever part the Executive
might have to play in the proceedings. The President's binding effect is
restricted to approving or cancelling the certificate once it is granted.
V. CONCLUSION
The Department of Transportation will have an important effect upon
aviation, as its formation will touch nearly every aspect of the industry.
The new act transfers the former safety functions of the CAB to the
NTSB, an included but apparently independent arm of the DOT. The
FAA will be absorbed as an entity by the new Department, where it will
serve as an Operating Agency and perform all of the functions for which
it had responsibility as an independent agency. The Secretary of the DOT
will have the responsibility for formulating coordinated policies for the
whole of the transportation industry, as well as those for the Department's
Operating Agencies. The CAB, however, will continue as an independent
agency and it will continue to be the responsibility of that agency to for-
mulate economic regulatory policy for all of aviation.
At this date certain questions raised by antagonistic elements of the
aviation industry remain unanswered. It remains to be seen whether
checks and balances between these separate offices and agencies will be
preserved and whether general aviation will continue its high degree of
growth and prosperity. The dual questions of greatest weight, however, are
whether a coordinated system of transportation is functionally attainable
and whether the DOT will be restricted in its attempt to accomplish the
objective for which it was created by the excluded independent agencies.
Milton E. Douglass, Jr.
12 1966 Senate Hearings 198.
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CAB and Labor Jurisdiction
I. INTRODUCTION
The CAB becomes involved in labor problems in two contexts. First,
under Section 401 (k) (4) of the Federal Aviation Act of 195 8,' a carrier
is required to comply with the Railway Labor Act' as a condition to obtain-
ing and retaining a certificate of public convenience and necessity. If a
labor union appears before the CAB, alleges that a carrier has violated the
Railway Labor Act, and asks the CAB to revoke the carrier's certificate,
does the CAB have the power to decide the question and, if so, is the CAB
required to reach a decision on the matter? If the CAB does make the
determination, what effect does the decision have on subsequent proceed-
ings before either a system board of adjustment' or a federal court?4
Conversely, what effect does a federal court determination have on later
action before the CAB? In addition to 401 (k) (4) violations, CAB in-
volvement with labor disputes may also arise when the Board approves
a merger under Section 408 (b) of the Federal Aviation Act. Pursuant
to that section, the Board has discretionary power to append such condi-
tions to a merger as it deems necessary,5 including labor protective pro-
visions, and the corresponding power to carry those conditions into effect.
It should be noted at the outset that the problem of jurisdiction in labor
disputes between airlines and their unions is an enigmatic one because the
CAB, the federal courts, system boards, and the National Mediation Board
(NMB) may all eventually become involved. This note will examine the
problems that arise when the CAB becomes involved in labor disputes
between unions and airlines in connection with airline mergers and under
Section 401 (k) (4) of the Federal Aviation Act.
II. MERGERS
In pursuance of the mandate of section 408, the CAB has been slowly
172 Stat. 754, 49 U.S.C. 5 1371 (1964): "It shall be a condition upon the holding of a
certificate by any air carrier that such carrier shall comply with sections 181-188 of Title 45."
249 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1964).
'Railway Labor Act, § 204, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1964).
4 In Moore v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 312 U.S. 630 (1941), the Court found that in "major"
disputes the federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the National Mediation Board [NMB].
'Section 408(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 767, 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b)
(1964) empowers the CAB to approve mergers "upon such terms and conditions as it shall find to
be just and reasonable and with such modifications as it may prescribe .. "
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evolving its method of resolving labor problems, such as lay-offs and
seniority, which are inherent in many mergers. The Board first imposed
labor protective provisions in connection with approval of the United-
Western merger in 1950' and since then, the CAB has become increas-
ingly more involved in labor difficulties. The United-Western merger was
first ordered by the CAB in August 1947.' The Board discussed the re-
quests of intervenor labor organizations that employee protective condi-
tions be attached to the sale, and at that time declined to impose any such
conditions on the ground that "there is nothing that would indicate
that any of the rights of Western's present employees on route No. 68
will be prejudiced by acquisition and operation of that route by United
.. .."' This precipitated action by the Air Lines Pilots Association (ALPA),
by which it requested reconsideration of the Board's order and the im-
position of employee protective conditions. The employees of Western
presented a similar petition. The CAB ordered all interested parties to
settle the matter among themselves. Repeated hearings and meetings failed
to resolve the situation until the 1950 hearings, in which the CAB finally
imposed the requested labor protective provisions. Possibly because of the
hectic furor raised by its deferral in the United-Western case, the CAB
in Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger' imposed comprehensive labor protective
conditions immediately, a practice in which the CAB has been engaging
ever since.
The extent of CAB power to impose protective provisions has been
interpreted as being extremely broad." When the Board approved the
merger of Pan American World Airways and American Overseas Airlines
in 1953, the latter's flight engineers protested the CAB's aproval of the
provisions giving flight engineers of Pan American seniority over all the
American Overseas Airlines engineers. In affirming the CAB's order, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
The authority of the Board to deal with proposed mergers of this type is
as provided in Sec. 408 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C.A.
Sec. 488. Its authority over the transfer of a certificate of public convenience
and necessity is derived from Sec. 401, 49 U.S.C.A. Sec. 481, and its general
powers and duties are as provided in Sec. 205(a), 49 U.S.C.A. Sec. 425(a)
6United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 11 C.A.B. 701 (1950), aff'd sub nor.
Western Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 194 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1952). The CAB stated:
Any doubts as to whether the general authority under sections 401 (i) and 408 (b)
to attach conditions to an order of approval issued thereunder includes the power to
impose conditions for the benefit of adversely affected employees are set at rest by
three decisions of the Supreme Court. United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225 (1939);
ICC v. Railway Labor Ass'n, 315 U.S. 373 (1942); Railway Labor Ass'n v. United
States, 339 U.S. 142 (1950). For present purposes, the net of these decisions is that
although the Board need not impose conditions for the benefit of adversely affected
employees in cases involving route transfers, acquisitions, and mergers, it may do
so in its discretion.
Needless to say, CAB labor jurisdiction has come a long way since these sage remarks.
United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 8 C.A.B. 298 (1947).
I1d. at 311.
15 C.A.B. 708 (1952), followed quickly by West Coast-Empire Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 971
(1952) But cf. discussion of Aaxico case in text accompanying notes 27-32 infra.
'
5 Oling v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n [ALPA], 346 F.2d 270 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
926 (1965).
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. . . . Although there is no express statutory grant of power to impose con-
ditions which will lessen the adverse impact of a merger upon employees of
the merged companies, such power is implicit as one necessary to the per-
formance of the Board's duty to condition approval with due regard to terms
which are just and reasonable in the interest of the public."
Moreover, in light of recent proceedings," it is clear that the courts
consider the CAB to be in full control. For instance, the Seventh Circuit
has stated, "Not only have the courts consistently held that the Board
has the jurisdiction to impose labor protective provisions including that
for seniority integration, as a condition of merger approval but, in Kent,
the reviewing court sustained the authority of the Board to formulate
its own integrated seniority list."
Once the Board imposes labor protective provisions as conditions for
approval of a merger, 4 the extent of subsequent CAB involvement is
usually limited to overseeing integration of seniority and other provisions
to ensure that its orders are carried out in a fair and equitable manner."
The CAB generally has inserted a provision providing for neutral de-
termination by an arbitration board if the parties are unable to agree
among themselves. 6 After agreement or after the Board award, any person
disclosing a substantial interest in the order may seek a hearing before
the CAB if it considers the agreement or award inequitable. The CAB
reserves jurisdiction to make such amendments, modifications, and addi-
tions to the labor conditions imposed as it deems necessary to ensure a
fair and equitable settlement. If the CAB turns down a petition for
hearing, that is, if it considers the award fair and equitable, the petition-
ing party may appeal the refusal to the courts under Section 1006 of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958."
"Kent v. CAB, 204 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1953).
"Outland v. CAB, 284 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Hyland v. United Air Lines, Inc., 254
F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Il1. 1966).
13Oling v. ALPA, 346 F.2d 270, 275 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926 (1965). Judge
Major said, "[The] CAB has been entrusted by Congress with the power to make determinations
affecting the protection of employees in merger cases .... " Id. at 276. Thus the CAB jurisdiction
is much more compelling than when the CAB had discretion in the United-Western case in 1950.
It should also be noted that mergers approved by the CAB are exempt from antitrust laws. Pan
American World Airways, Inc. v. Long, 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
14See, e.g., United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 11 C.A.B. 701 (1950), aff'd
sub nom. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 194 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1952).
'aSee Hyland v. United Air Lines, Inc., 254 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. IlI. 1966).
16 Ibid.
'7 See Oling v. ALPA, 346 F.2d 270 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926 (1965).
872 Stat. 795, 49 U.S.C. § 1486 (1964):
(a) Any order, afrmative or negative, issued by the Board or Administrator
under this chapter . .. shall be subject to review by the courts of appeals of the
United States or the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
upon petition, filed . .. by any person disclosing a substantial interest in such order.
(d) Upon transmittal of the petition to the Board or Administrator, the court
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or set aside the order complained
of, in whole or in part, and if need be, to order further proceedings by the Board
or Administrator.
(f) The judgment and decree of the court affirming, modifying, or setting aside
any such order of the Board or Administrator shall be subject only to review by
the Supreme Court of the United States. ...
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The appeal provided by this section seems to be the exclusive remedy
for an aggrieved person of interest in a merger situation. In Oling v.
ALPA"9 the plaintiffs sought a review by the CAB of a seniority list inte-
grated by arbitration machinery. The CAB declined because it considered
the list to be fair and equitable. Plaintiffs did not appeal the CAB decision
to a court of appeals as provided in Section 1006 of the act but, rather,
challenged the CAB-approved award in a federal district court. On appeal
from a dismissal of this suit, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the dismissal was proper. CAB "jurisdiction was invoked and pur-
sued by plaintiffs to the point of an adverse decision, and they failed to
seek relief therefrom by a review in the manner provided by Congress.""0
The court did not answer the question of whether CAB jurisdiction was
exclusive. Judge Major said, "We do not reach the issue as to whether the
CAB had exclusive jurisdiction, as argued by defendants, or concurrent
jurisdiction, as argued by plaintiffs."'" If plaintiffs had gone into the
district court with precisely the same issues prior to the Board's decision
that the integrated seniority lists were fair, would the district court have
had jurisdiction? There would seem to be no statutory obstacles to block
entering both the CAB forum and the federal district court and ques-
tioning the fairness of a finding by the arbitration board, provided both
actions were commenced before either tribunal reached a decision. And
if the federal district court reached a determination before the CAB made
a finding, a question could be raised as to whether this would be res judicata
as to the CAB proceeding.
The only reported case which has considered the point, Hyland v.
United Air Lines, Inc., ' resolved the first of the above issues in favor of
exclusive CAB jurisdiction, thereby obviating the necessity of consider-
ing the res judicata question. In Hyland a group of pilots complained
that the duty of fair representation had been violated by the bargaining
representative when it acted in concert with the airline in formulating
and approving the integrated seniority list after the merger. There were
charges of bad faith, breach of contract, and failure by the system board
to integrate the seniority lists in a "fair and equitable manner." The court
posed the problem of "whether the charges in this complaint are of the
type which only the CAB can hear."" Here, the plaintiffs went directly
to the district court for a review of the fairness of the system board's
decision, while in Oling the flight engineers sought judicial review of
the Board's award only after they had received an unfavorable decision
from the CAB. Yet the same result was reached in both cases, for in
Hyland, the court found the issues to be within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the CAB and, therefore, dismissed the district court action. In support
of its decision, the court stated:
' 346 F.2d 270 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926 (1965).
20 Id. at 278.
21 Ibid.
2 254 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. I11. 1966).
23id. at 371.
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This important area of the total complex of merger considerations cannot
be subject to independent scrutiny and interference by the courts pursuant
to a separate statutory scheme. The parties affected by the CAB merger order
cannot be required to answer in different charges for actions taken under
the CAB merger umbrella. Were this court to hear this case, it would be
directly entering an area over which the CAB has properly reserved juris-
diction; were the relief prayed for to be granted here, the orders and interests
of the CAB might be undermined. Congress cannot have intended such a
collision."
Thus, if the decision in Hyland is upheld on appeal, the CAB would
appear to be the exclusive initial forum for resolving disputes arising out
of labor protective conditions surrounding approval of a merger, and
court action would be limited to review under section 1006.25 It should be
noted that the Hyland court's use of the term exclusive jurisdiction is not
precisely correct, for the courts undoubtedly have jurisdiction over fair
representation cases,"5 whether they arise in connection with a merger or
not. Thus, the principle would seem to be more aptly termed primary
jurisdiction, notwithstanding any language in Hyland to the contrary.
Since primary jurisdiction indicates concurrent jurisdiction between the
court and the agency,"7 the action by the Hyland court can be properly
viewed as a deferral to the agency's "expertise." However, if all forums will
defer to the CAB all labor questions which affect a merger proceeding
pending before the CAB, then the CAB's jurisdiction is exclusive in
practice if not in theory.
Despite the apparent clarity achieved by Oling and Hyland as to juris-
diction and review of issues arising out of a merger, the CAB in ALPA
v. CAB" recently introduced a third tangent which is still unsettled.
When Aaxico Airlines merged with Saturn Airways, the CAB approved
the merger itself, but because Aaxico and ALPA were involved in a
labor dispute then pending before the federal district court in San An-
tonio, Texas, 9 the CAB held that no integration of flight crew personnel
could be initiated until final settlement of that dispute.30 ALPA objected
to the merger approval, particularly on the ground that the CAB allowed
the merger to become effective prior to a determination in the pending
federal court action in which Aaxico was charged with numerous viola-
tions of the Railway Labor Act. ALPA based its contentions on Section
401 (k) (4) of the Federal Aviation Act. Thus, for the first time the
24id. at 372.
a572 Stat. 795 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1486 (1964). The court, in dicta, overstated the case
by saying: "[The] CAB has acquired extensive experience and expertise in the special areas of
labor relations .. " 254 F. Supp. at 372.
2 Vaca v. Sipes, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4213 (U.S. 27 Feb. 1967); and Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944).
"
7 See generally 2 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW §§ 19.01-.09 (1958).
28 360 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
"
9 Aaxico Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, Civil No. 2996, W.D. Tex., 12 July 1963, rev'd, 331 F.2d
433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964). The case was being heard on remand at the
time of the CAB action. In reversing, the Fifth Circuit held the dispute was minor and remanded
the case to the district court for hearing of certain issues and referral to the System Board of
Adjustment. See Note, 31 J. Ast L. & COM. 271 (1965).
a°Saturn-Aaxico Merger Case, CAB Docket No. 15675, 1 June 1965, review denied d order
modified in minor respects, CAB Order No. E-22680 (21 Sept. 1965).
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CAB found itself doubly involved in labor problems, having both section
401 (k) (4) jurisdiction and merger jurisdiction. ALPA made strenuous
objections to the merger approval and appealed the approval order, claim-
ing that the CAB had abused its discretion. 1 Although the CAB refused
to withhold approval, it decided that this labor dispute was sufficiently
important to require postponement of flight crew integration until the
dispute was settled, while all other facets of the merger would be allowed
to proceed. The court held that this action was not an abuse of discretion,
and in the course of its opinion stated: "At least in the circumstances of
this record, we attribute to a pending labor dispute no such overwhelming
dominance of the discretion vested in the CAB by Congress to weigh
all factors relevant to the public interest ... ."' Subsequently, the system
board found for ALPA in the Aaxico-ALPA rift, which decision was
enforced by the courts, and integration of Aaxico and Saturn pilots has
since been accomplished."
In sum, several points should be noted. CAB discretion under section
408 (b) is seemingly very broad, and its determinations as to how many
or how few labor protective conditions should be imposed will not be
easily overturned on appeal." However, CAB discretion in labor dis-
putes was apparently truncated somewhat by dictum in ALPA v. CAB,
where the court in reviewing the Saturn-Aaxico merger stated: "The
CAB would, of course, be derelict if, in approving the merger, it refused
to take any cognizance that such a dispute existed."' Henceforth, the
CAB should heed this dictum and consider any existing labor dispute in-
volving one of the merging carriers. If such a dispute is not in the process
of resolution before another forum, could the CAB refer the dispute to a
more competent forum and decline to integrate seniority lists pending
determination by such forum? If it did not refer to another forum and
did not act on the dispute itself, a refusal to take cognizance of it would
probably be an abuse of discretion.
Certain guidelines have been formulated to aid the CAB in its decisions
involving labor. It has been the practice of the Board to impose protective
conditions as a part of the merger approval and to retain jurisdiction to
ensure a fair and equitable settlement of the problems.' While the CAB
evidently feels that protection of the working forces is an important con-
sideration in the merger situation, it will not normally act where other
3 1ALPA v. CAB, 360 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The CAB also decided correctly, according
to Judge McGowan, that Aaxico's past violations were not indicative of its future demeanor re-
garding continued violations of the Railway Labor Act, so as to preclude it from ever living up
to the certificate condition that it comply with the Railway Labor Act. For this finding, the
court relied on Great Lakes Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 294 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 965 (1961).
3
"ALPA v. CAB, supra note 31, at 840.
" Award: Aaxico Airlines, Inc. and Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 47 Lab. Arb. 289 (1966). Enf'd,
Aaxico Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, Civil No. 2996, W.D. Tex., 3 March 1965, (supplemental order
12 March 1965), aff'd per curiain, 61 L.R.R.M. 2560 (5th Cir. 1966).
" However, the CAB's discretion is probably not unlimited. See discussion of Aaxico case in
text accompanying note 35 infra.
35 ALPA v. CAB, 360 F.2d 837, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
'MSee, e.g., Oling v. ALPA, 364 F.2d 270 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926 (1965).
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forums are already coping with a labor dispute involving one of the
carriers. This presents somewhat of an anomaly. While labor protection
seems to be an important part of the merger, it may not be so all per-
vasive that merger approval can be defeated due to an existing labor dis-
pute, at least so long as the dispute is pending before another competent
forum. For an agency not created as a labor board and not claiming any
"expertise" in labor matters, the CAB has become rather deeply involved
in union-management and inter-union labor disputes arising out of, and
even those not directly a result of, mergers between two carriers."
III. SECTION 401 (K) (4)
The second avenue by which a labor dispute may come to the CAB is
potentially a very busy thoroughfare, because Section 401 (k) (4) of
the Federal Aviation Act authorizes CAB enforcement of the breadth
of the Railway Labor Act" in that it requires compliance with the Railway
Labor Act as a prerequisite for holding a certificate of public convenience
and necessity.
Under the Railway Labor Act" disputes concerning changes in rates of
pay, rules, or working conditions not covered in a bargaining agreement-
so-called "major" disputes-are subject to an elaborate dispute settle-
ment procedure which involves mediatory efforts by the National Media-
tion Board (NMB)." Major disputes may come before the federal courts
in several ways, such as for settlement of the question of whether the
dispute is major or minor,' or in a suit for injunctive relief to maintain
the status quo while the dispute procedures of the act are pending.'
However, the outcome of these major disputes is ultimately left in the
hands of the parties, with self-help as the final remedy. ' Disputes arising
out of interpretation of an existing term in a collective bargaining agree-
ment-so called "minor disputes"-have as their exclusive remedy sub-
mission to a System Board of Adjustment created by agreement between
the parties." The courts have no initial jurisdiction over minor disputes
except to compel submission to the system board4' and, as noted above, to
" See, e.g., Saturn-Aaxico Merger Case, CAB Docket No. 15675, 1 June 1965, review denied
El order modified in minor respects, CAB Order No. E-22680 (21 Sept. 1965).
3872 Stat. 754 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1964).
3944 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1964).4
0See 44 Stat. 582 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1964).
41 See, e.g., Aaxico Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 331 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
933 (1964), noted 31 J. AIR L. & CoM. 271 (1965); Flight Eng'rs Int'l Ass'n [FEIA] v. American
Airlines, Inc., 303 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1962).
"See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 169 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
' See Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 372 U.S. 284 (1963).
44 Pursuant to the command of the Railway Labor Act § 204, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C.5 184 (1964). A difference exists between the airlines and the railroads in this regard. In the rail-
road industry, minor disputes are referable to the NRAB which was created by § 3 of the act. It
is an administrative agency. 44 Stat. 578 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1964).
'In Slocum v. Delaware L. & W.R.R., 339 U.S. 239, 244 (1950), the Supreme Court gave
the system boards exclusive primary jurisdiction in "minor" disputes. See Gunther v. San Diego
& Ariz. E. Ry., 382 U.S. 257 (1965); IAM v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1963);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. Ry., 353 U.S. 30 (1957); Elgin, J. & E.
Ry. v. Burley, 372 U.S. 711 (1945); Aaxico Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 331 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964); Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
325 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1963); and FEIA v. American Airlines, Inc., 303 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1962).
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determine whether a dispute is "major" or "minor." The awards of a
system board are enforceable by the courts and are seemingly binding
as to the merits of the dispute." In addition to its involvement with major
disputes, the NMB under Section 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Acte7
has the power to determine representation disputes. These administrative
determinations are generally not reviewable by the courts, the result being
that the determination is final and binding on the parties." Each of these
procedures may involve an allegation that the carrier has violated the
Railway Labor Act, which allegation may bring 401 (k) (4) into play.
The disputes have generally been settled in the context of the particular
procedure,"9 but where the particular procedure fails to result in a solu-
tion and a party alleges a violation of section 401 (k) (4), CAB juris-
diction attaches regardless of whether another forum has jurisdiction. The
anomalous result is that the CAB has broader jurisdiction to resolve Rail-
way Labor Act violations than any other forum, administrative or judicial.
However, the mere fact that a petition is filed under 401 (k) (4) does
not necessarily mean that the CAB will reach a decision on the matter,
for a hearing and/or determination of the allegations by the CAB has
been held to be discretionary." While section 401 (k) (4), in using the
word "shall" rather than "may," imposes a mandatory duty on the carrier
to comply with the Railway Labor Act, section 401 (g)," the procedural
section on enforcement, states: "The Board upon petition or complaint
• . . may . . . suspend any such certificate . . . or may revoke any such
certificate . . . for intentional failure to comply . . . [with section
401 (k) (4) ]." This discretionary language has allowed the courts and
the CAB to make 401 (k) (4) a watered-down section, possibly violated
but not necessarily enforced.
To date, there have been few cases involving the CAB in labor dis-
putes under 401 (k) (4). However, those reported seem to have delineated
the circumstances which will give rise to CAB involvement. Flight Eng'rs
Int'l Ass'n (FEIA) v. CAB" is a good example of the CAB's "discretion""
to refuse to hear a 401 (k) (4) complaint. In that case FEIA, the certified
bargaining agent for the flight engineers on Eastern Air Lines, filed a
'Gunther v. San Diego & Ariz. E. Ry., 382 U.S. 257 (1965); IAM v. Central Airlines, Inc.,
372 U.S. 682 (1963); Hyland v. United Air Lines, Inc., 254 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. I11. 1966);
and Capitol Airways, Inc. v. ALPA, 237 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Tenn. 1963), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 341 F.2d 288 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 913 (employer), 381 U.S. 952 (employee)
(1965).
4748 Stat. 1168 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1964).
48 See Comment, 32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 249 (1966).
"' Ibid. In major and minor dispute situations the complaining party is seeking a remedy for
action which allegedly violates the act in regard to the procedure involved, i.e., violation of the
agreement in minor disputes which is for the System Boards; violation of the major dispute pro-
cedures or noncompliance with the act which is for the courts to enforce.
" However, this discretion is probably not unlimited. See discussion of Aaxico case in text
accompanying note 35 supra. As the courts and the CAB have noted, there may be a "duty" to
proceed in an appropriate case. See, e.g., FEIA v. CAB, 332 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 945 (1963); and ALPA v. Southern Airways, Inc., Enforcement Proceeding, 36 C.A.B.
430, 433, 464, petition for review withdrawn (5th Cir. 1962).
s 72 Stat. 754 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1371. See also Comment, 32 J. AIR L. & COM. at 250 n.7.
52332 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
53 See note 50 supra.
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complaint with the CAB for alleged violations of Section 401 (k) (4) of
the Federal Aviation Act. The Director of the CAB's Bureau of Enforce-
ment felt FEIA had reasonable grounds, and that a formal investigation
of such alleged violations would be in the public interest. The complaint
was docketed, with a notation to the effect that FEIA had previously filed
two actions in a federal court in New York against Eastern for the same
reasons. The previous actions had both resulted in a denial of the union's
requests for interlocutory relief." The CAB dismissed the complaint,
reasoning that the public interest would not be served by a lengthy hear-
ing held "solely to provide a forum for the adjustment of private griev-
ances, particularly where an adequate remedy is available in the courts,
and where, as here, there has been resort to the courts to the extent pre-
viously indicatd."" On appeal from the dismissal, the court found that
the CAB "does have a discretionary power to dismiss a complaint which
states reasonable grounds for believing that the Act has been or is being
violated when it reasonably concludes that it would be in the public
interest to do so, although this discretion is subject to review."" The
court further stated, "A reading of . . . [the two acts] indicates that the
Board is not expected to act as a general labor board for the airline in-
dustry in all cases where a carrier has violated the Railway Labor Act ....
[I]f the Board is denied . .. [the power to dismiss] that is the role it
would be obliged to assume."5 The CAB has also refused to hear a com-
plaint where the petitioning party has submitted substantially the same
issues to another forum which is either in the process of determining,
or has already determined, the issues."8 In the Saturn-Aaxico merger,
ALPA has asserted violations of the Railway Labor Act by Aaxico to
support its contention that the CAB should disapprove the merger. Never-
theless, the CAB approved the merger and ALPA appealed." The court
considered the CAB's refusal to determine the asserted labor violations
understandable, since the dispute had come "to the CAB's attention at
a time when the complaining party has long since acted successfully to
get the dispute in process of resolution by a system board of adjust-
ment . . . ." The CAB itself has enunciated the same doctrine. In
Flight Engineers v. Western Air Lines,a' the CAB upheld the Director of
Enforcement's refusal to file a complaint against Western for asserted
'4 The first of these decisions was FEIA v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 208 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y.),
afr'd per curiam, 307 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 945 (1963); the second,
FEIA v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd on other grounds, 311
F.2d 745 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 924 (1963). The court of appeals' affirmance of the
second case was on the ground that in that action the union essentially was seeking to force Eastern
to bargain with FEIA rather than ALPA as to the terms and conditions of employment of Eastern's
pilot engineers when a substantial representation dispute existed, and that under the Railway Labor
Act the courts lacked jurisdiction in such cases.
"FEIA v. CAB, 332 F.2d 312, 313 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
'6Id. at 314.
"ild. at 315.
'SALPA v. CAB, 360 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
69 Ibid.
60 Id. at 840.
6134 C.A.B. 834 (1961).
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violations of the Railway Labor Act. The CAB pointed out that the
same issues were then pending before the courts and a system board;
thus, there were not sufficient grounds for the exercise of CAB juris-
diction. Moreover, in ALPA v. Southern Airways, Enforcement,'2 the CAB
refused to entertain a petition of the Southern Pilots Association, an
organization created by replacement pilots, since ALPA and Southern
Airways had entered into a collective bargaining contract pursuant to
a prior CAB order and there was no showing that the carrier had failed
to comply with the act.
There are, however, situations in which the CAB will entertain juris-
diction over 401 (k) (4) violations. If the CAB is the initial forum, or
there has been no prior binding determination by any other forum as to
the rights of the parties or their compliance with the Railway Labor Act,
the CAB has exercised its power and heard the complaint, as in ALPA v.
Southern Airways, Inc., Enforcement Proceeding."3 There, the major dis-
pute procedures had been exhausted and the pilots were on strike. Re-
placements had been hired and the carrier insisted on, and refused to
bargain over, super-seniority given the replacements. ALPA alleged that
this was a violation of the Railway Labor Act and, thus, of 401 (k) (4).
Southern had challenged the Board's jurisdiction to hear the complaint.
The trial examiner, in a well-reasoned discussion which was adopted by
the Board, held that the CAB had jurisdiction since ALPA alleged a viola-
tion of the Federal Aviation Act and the CAB was the only agency
which could revoke a carrier's certificate. 4 ALPA had brought a con-
current action in a federal district court, requesting injunctive relief and
damages from Southern."3 In reaching its decision prior to the CAB's de-
cision, but after the examiner's initial decision, the court had stated that
its jurisdiction was concurrent with that of the CAB in a labor dispute.
The court rejected the request of Southern that, under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, its action be stayed pending a final decision by the
CAB, and held that Southern had not violated the Railway Labor Act.
The court stated that although the same underlying dispute was involved,
the action concerned issues of law only, not factual issues requiring
appraisals by a special tribunal, and final determination by the CAB would
be neither res judicata nor a guide to the court." The CAB subsequently
found that the carrier had violated the act and required the parties to
resume negotiations, imposed certain conditions to govern them, and re-
tained jurisdiction to ensure compliance.
The fact that the district court reached its decision prior to the final
decision of the CAB is worthy of special emphasis. The court concluded
that Southern was not under a duty to bargain with ALPA over the
6' 37 C.A.B. 765, appeal dismissed as moot, 323 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 954 (1964).
6336 C.A.B. 430, petition for review withdrawn (5th Cir. 1962).
6 4 id. at 465-67.
65 ALPA v. Southern Airways, Inc., 7 Av. Cas. 5 17936 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
e Id. at 5 17937. See text accompanying notes 83-92 infra.
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seniority rights of strikers. The CAB, however, while it noted the court's
decision, made an independent analysis of the facts and the law and reached
a contrary result. The court had stated in its opinion that the examiner's
decision was not binding on it;"7 the CAB, "by a parity of reasoning,"
concluded that "the Board must make its own determination on the issues
of its proceeding, and that it is open to the Board to draw inferences and
reach conclusions which may differ from those reached by the court.""8
Evidently, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, which in general prevents
the same parties from relitigating previously litigated issues before a
second forum was not considered applicable. In the area of administrative
proceedings, however, there is always a question of whether the doctrine
applies at all. The general rule seems to be that where the agency is in-
volved in an adjudicatory proceeding, as here, the doctrine applies."
Thus, an order of the CAB would seemingly act as a bar to relitigating
the same fact issues between the same parties in a subsequent action."0
Conversely, a court decision is generally considered to be res judicata in
a later administrative proceeding.' However, the general rule may not
apply in a 401 (k) (4) proceeding. Since the CAB would not be a party
in the court proceeding, the court's decision would probably not be bind-
ing on it," but the CAB would probably be derelict in its duty if it did
not at least consider the court's decision."' Assuming that the CAB con-
siders the court's decision, but fails to follow it, the CAB's decision is
not binding on the court, and if the court's decision is not binding on
the CAB, two forums having concurrent jurisdiction can reach contrary
results, and both are valid. 4
Thus, the CAB has discretion to refuse to hear a complaint, and will
seemingly refuse to act in cases in which the complaint is based on allega-
tions which have been or are in the process of being determined by an-
other agency or the courts. However, if it is the initial forum it may
certainly exercise jurisdiction, as it did in Southern Airways, although
" See text following note 64 supra. This conclusion seems to be correct. See 2 DAVIS, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW 586 (1958), stating that an examiner's decision is not a final decision for res
judicata purposes.
6SALPA v. Southern Airways, Inc., Enforcement Proceeding, 36 C.A.B. 430, 431, petition for
review withdrawn (5th Cir. 1962). In FEIA v. Western Airlines, 34 C.A.B. 834, 835 n.7 (1961),
the CAB expressly declined to dismiss on the basis that prior court decisions were binding on it.
692 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 18.02-.03 (1958).
"Id. at §§ 18.02-.03, .09. However, this may not apply on an agency-to-court basis. Whether
a CAB ruling is ever res judicata in the courts is highly doubtful since, as the Supreme Court has
stated: "We consider that the rulings, interpretations, and opinions of the Administration under
this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do contribute a body
of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guid-
ance." Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1947).
7'2 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 18.11 (1958).
a Ibid. The theory seems to be that the statutes of the agency give it primary responsibility
to hear the dispute-sort of a "preferred forum." Davis thinks this point is crucial. Cf. NLRB
v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 682 (1951).73 ALPA v. CAB, 360 F.2d 837, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
"
4 Cf. NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
906 (1953); Longshoreman's Union v. Juneau Corp., 83 F. Supp. 224 (1949), aff'd, 342 U.S.
857 (1952). See also JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 135-36 (1965).
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such exercise is evidently discretionary also.7 A concurrent suit filed in
a federal district court while the action is pending before the Board is
not necessarily ground for dismissal. This seems to be based on the theory
that the CAB is the only forum which can revoke a certificate, and con-
current action by a court does not affect this basic fact. The only logical
basis for denying a hearing in any case, if the above stated theory of
exercise of jurisdiction is correct, is that there has already been a determi-
nation of the issue by another forum, adverse to the petitioning party,
or, if the issue is pending before another forum, that a hearing would
be duplicative and wasteful since the factual issue, which is the basis of
the asserted 401 (k) (4) violation, will be resolved in the other forum.
Finally, the CAB has stated it will not determine an issue in a 401 (k) (4)
proceeding which is within the special competence of another agency,
i.e., an NMB representation determination,"' or one which does not directly
involve the conduct of the carrier.7 This seems consistent with the above
theory, however, since such issues are not claims of carrier violation and
are incidentally involved with air transportation, if at all."8
It was noted by the district court in ALPA v. Southern Airways, Inc.,79
and by the CAB in its related proceeding,"0 that the jurisdiction of the
two forums seems to be concurrent. But where a CAB finding under
section 401 (k) (4) has become final, as in Holman v. Southern Airways,
Inc.,"5 a federal district court, in a suit filed subsequent to the CAB de-
termination, lacks jurisdiction to enjoin an airline pilots association from
putting into effect a collective bargaining agreement entered into pursuant
to the CAB's order. The Holman court said: "This Court is convinced
that it does not have jurisdiction to grant the plaintiffs the relief they
seek, in as much as jurisdiction to review orders of the CAB is vested
exclusively in the Circuit Court of Appeals.""s Holman is distinguishable
from the Southern Airways case in that in the latter case the two actions
were relatively concurrent in time. ALPA initially went to the CAB,
and before the CAB decision was reached ALPA filed in the district court.
In Holman, the plaintiffs did not file in the district court until the CAB
7 Both the courts and the CAB have talked in terms of a "duty" to proceed or of jurisdiction
in "appropriate cases" only. See, e.g., FEIA v. CAB, 332 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1964); ALPA v.
Southern Airways, Inc., Enforcement Proceeding, 36 C.A.B. 430, 433, 464, Petition for review
withdrawn (5th Cir. 1962). The conclusions as to when this "duty" exists are based on this writer's
analysis of patterns existing in the cases in this area.
" See, e.g., ALPA v. Southern Airways, Enforcement, 37 C.A.B. 765, appeal dismissed as moot,
323 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954 (1964); and FEIA v. Western Air Lines,
34 C.A.B. 834 (1961). This seems to be an application of an inter-agency primary jurisdiction
doctrine.
" See, e.g., ALPA v. Southern Airways, Enforcement, 37 C.A.B. 765, appeal dismissed as moot,
323 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954 (1964).
" Consider, however, a claim of union/carrier duplicity against a group of employees. Depend-
ing on the characterization given the complaint by the CAB, it could easily hear or avoid hearing
the complaint.
797 Av. Cas. 5 17936 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
80 ALPA v. Southern Airways, Inc., Enforcement Proceeding, 36 C.A.B. 430, petition for review
withdrawn (5th Cir. 1962).
81 210 F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Ga. 1962). For a similar holding arising out of a merger approval
see Oling v. ALPA, 346 F.2d 270 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926 (1965).
82210 F. Supp. at 410.
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had rendered its decision. Thus, a final order had been made and con-
current jurisdiction no longer existed. Therefore, a petition filed in a
district court after a Board determination will be treated as an indirect
appeal and, as such, will be rejected as being contrary to the statutory
means of appeal provided.
As noted by the Board in Southern Airways,a the CAB is the only
agency which can revoke a carrier's certificate. The CAB has, however,
apparently applied a deferral of jurisdiction doctrine where the claim has
involved a representation dispute which is within the special competence
of the NMB, 4 or where the dispute involves contract interpretation and
is pending before a system board of adjustment."5 Deferral has been
applied in two ways. First, the CAB has refused to re-examine or go
behind the determinations of the specialized agency involved." In other
instances, the CAB has declined to act where another agency is then
hearing the dispute." In both areas, the "expert" forum is resolving, or
has resolved, the dispute, and the CAB accords controlling weight to that
decision. The reason for this practice seems to be that the CAB recognizes
that, in these cases, it is dealing with labor disputes, pure and simple.
There is no question within its claimed "expertise" and, more importantly,
these other forums do possess the necessary "expertise" in labor matters
and are available for resolution of the disputes.8 This conclusion is sup-
ported by analogy to the merger cases. In approving a merger, the CAB
imposes conditions on the merging carriers which it considers fair and
equitable, such as requiring seniority integration. But, rather than inte-
grating the seniority lists itself, the CAB leaves this to the parties them-
selves or to neutral arbitration. Deferral to more competent agencies seems
to be a laudable practice, for the CAB thereby gains the wisdom of those
well-versed in the area of labor disputes.
However, no similar beneficial results are achievable by deferral of the
CAB to the courts or vice-versa. As between the courts, which are neither
technical nor expert bodies, and the CAB, the doctrine of primary juris-
diction seems inapposite. Neither forum has any claimed "expertise" which
would necessitate a deferral for determination of a question within the
special knowledge and experience of that forum. As stated by the CAB
83 ALPA v. Southern Airways, Inc., Enforcement Proceeding, 36 C.A.B. 430, petition for re-
view withdrawn (5th Cir. 1962).
84 See ALPA v. Southern Airways, Enforcement, 37 C.A.B. 765, appeal dismissed as moot, 323
F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954 (1964) (CAB could not review claims of
union discrimination against employees nor would it look behind a NMB certification); FEIA v.
Western Airlines, 34 C.A.B. 834 (1961) (NMB, in certifying the union, had found no merit to
the union's allegation that the carrier had violated Railway Labor Act); and FEIA v. CAB, 332
F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (certification petition pending before NMB).85 ALPA v. CAB, 360 F.2d 837, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
" See text accompanying note 84 supra.
87 ALPA v. CAB, 360 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1966); FEIA v. CAB, 332 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir.
1964).
"
8Cf. CAB v. Modern Air Transport, 179 F.2d 622, 624 (2d Cir. 1950), where the court said:
"[There is no] question within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal . . . [which] de-
mands the exercise of administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge and experience of the
administrative tribunal."
8 See Part II supra.
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in Southern Airways," the availability of remedies by other agencies under
the Railway Labor Act or by the courts in enforcing the duty of com-
pliance "would not postpone resort to the remedy contained in the Federal
Aviation Act under the primary jurisdiction doctrine. [Courts] . . . would
[not] constitute an expert forum or technical body within the meaning
of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction." Conversely, the CAB, while it
is an expert forum with special knowledge in aviation matters, was not
intended to act as a labor agency, and its competence in labor disputes
must be considered as being somewhat short of the "expertise" required
for proper application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
The only conclusion possible in this area is that the CAB will evidently
defer to another agency with "expertise" where its decision will be bind-
ing on the merits."1 Aside from this deferral, concurrent jurisdiction exists
between the courts and the CAB as to labor disputes for violations of
the Railway Labor Acte even though the CAB is the only forum which
can revoke the carrier's certificate. The only essential distinction between
the forums is the remedy available.
IV. CONCLUSION
The CAB has become involved in labor disputes in two contexts,
mergers and 401 (k) (4) violations. In the merger situation, labor condi-
tions are imposed as a part of ensuring a fair and equitable adjustment
of the rights and liabilities of the parties to the merger. Under 401 (k) (4),
however, the CAB, if it acts at all, acts as a general labor agency, resolv-
ing disputes unconnected with any other statutory function given it under
the act. But explicit authority is given to the CAB to do so under
401 (k) (4).
The unfortunate thing about 401 (k) (4) is that it creates a forum
for the hearing of alleged "unfair labor practices" which neither claims
to be nor necessarily wants to act as a general labor agency. The only
parties who can take advantage of this forum are the unions or disgruntled
employees who are claiming union/carrier duplicity. This gives the union
an additional forum in which to prosecute its claims, and if the Southern
Airways decisions stand, the union has two chances at victory on the
same issue. To avoid becoming a fourth baseline forum in union/carrier
disputes, the CAB should decline to act on an alleged violation of the
Railway Labor Act until one of the other forums, be it court, NMB, or
system board, has found the carrier guilty of a Railway Labor Act viola-
tion, as in the ALPA-Aaxico bout. But this is not to say that 401 (k) (4)
should be repealed. There may be cases which present such exceptional
circumstances that relief in the other forums would be inadequate or
would come too late in time to be of any value. In such cases the CAB
9 36 C.A.B. 430, 466, petition for review withdrawn (5th Cir. 1962).
91 See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.
2That courts have jurisdiction to enforce the duties of the Railway Labor Act seems well
settled. See Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n # 40, 300 U.S. 515 (193.0).
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should be available to act. This would seem to be well within the CAB's
discretion under applicable court decisions."' The mandate of section
401 (k) (4) could be adequately protected without the CAB's assuming
the role of a general labor board" by relying on other expert agencies to
determine the existence of a violation of the Railway Labor Act. This
exercise of restraint by the CAB would not have the effect of allowing
another tribunal to decide an ultimate issue upon which the Board must
base a certificate suspension or revocation. As a practical matter, the
revocation of a carrier's certificate coincides so closely with its financial
ruin that the carrier, faced with a decision by another tribunal that the
carrier has violated the Railway Labor Act, will most certainly comply
with the act rather than run the risk of revocation under 401 (k) (4).
Francis J. Cotter
"Compare this with similar deferral of jurisdiction exercised by the NLRB where the same
dispute is referable to an arbitrator under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act. See, e.g., Ramsey v.
NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112
N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). See also Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964); and
Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 198 n.6 (1962).
"See text accompanying notes 75-78, 83-89 supra.
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Conflicts - Significant Contacts - Change in
Decisional Law Pending Appeal
Four young men were returning to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, from a
football game in Miami, Florida, in a private airplane piloted by one of the
four. They ran into bad weather and the plane crashed near Brunswick,
Georgia. A consolidated action was brought in Pennsylvania on behalf of
the estates of the three passengers of the plane against the administrator
of the estate of the deceased pilot. The parties did not initially question
the application of Georgia law to the issues of liability and damages. Under
the Georgia Guest Statute the burden was on the plaintiffs to show that
the pilot was guilty of gross negligence. Judgment was rendered in favor
of the defendant. Subsequent to the perfection of appeal, another case'
was decided which was similar in nature to the case at bar. In that case
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the law of Pennsylvania (which
required only proof of simple negligence) should govern the substantive
rights of the parties. Basing their contention upon that case, the plaintiffs
in the instant case asserted for the first time on appeal that Pennsylvania
law should determine the liability of the defendant. Held, reversed: The
plaintiffs' failure to assert at the trial the contention that the law of the
place of the tort is not invariably controlling did not constitute waiver or
preclude seeking the benefit of the laws of the forum which had the most
substantial contacts with the parties. Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620,
222 A.2d 897 (1966).
In order to determine the ramifications of the Kuchinic case, two issues
must be considered. First, what law is the court to apply when there are
two or more states with interests in the outcome? Second, what right does
a party have to assert for the first time on appeal a change in the law
that was formulated after the trial court has rendered its decision?
For the answer to the first issue, one must only look to the recent trend
of decisions in the field of tort conflict-of-laws.' Although once the
accepted rule of almost every state, and still the judicially endorsed prin-
ciple in several, ' the doctrine of lex loci delicti4 has begun a rapid deteriora-
'Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
For an excellent discussion of the lex loci delicti doctrine as it has been applied in the past see
Wolens, A Thaw in the Reign of Lex Loci Delicti, 32 J. AIR L. & COM. 408 (1966).
'Not all jurisdictions have departed from the doctrine of lex loci delicti. For a recent com-
pilation of the jurisdictions that still apply the lex loci rule, see Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 12 (1964).
In Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W. 2d 408, 412 (1965), the court stated that "the
great weight of authority in this country still follows this rule." More recently, in Rubitsky v.
Russo's Derby, Inc., 70 Ill.2d 482, 216 N.E.2d 680, 681 (1966), the court remarked, "Where an
action is brought in Illinois for a tort committed in another state, the substantial law of the latter
will be applied by the Illinois Court."
'This doctrine was clearly set forth by Mr. Justice Holmes in Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R.,
194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904). He stated:
But when such a liability [wrongful death] is enforced in a jurisdiction foreign to
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tion in the face of newer, more flexible alternative rules.' Courts are no
longer content to apply a mechanized principle whereby the substantive
rights and liabilities of the litigants are to be determined by the law of the
place of the wrong." The first Restatement recognized two exceptions to the
traditional conflicts rule: the forum is to apply its own procedural rules,'
and the forum is to apply its own law when the law of the place of the
wrong is contrary to a strong public policy of the forum! Some courts, in
order to circumvent the rigidity imposed by the lex loci rule, have char-
acterized certain substantive issues, including the damages issue, as pro-
cedural and thereby subject to the law of the forum.' Other courts have
created further exceptions to the lex loci rule in order to justify application
of their own law rather than the law of the place of wrong." It is clear that
the courts are beginning to awaken to the fact that the place of the acci-
dent may be entirely fortuitous in some instances and, therefore, that it
should not be the lone determinative factor." The forerunner in this move-
the place of the wrongful act, obviously that does not mean that the act in any
degree is subject to the lex fori, with regard to its quality or its consequences.
On the other hand, it equally little means that the law of the place of the act is
operative outside its own territory. The theory of the foreign suit is that although
the act complained of was not subject to law having force in the forum, it gave rise
to an obligation, an obligatio, which, like other obligations, follows the person, and
may be enforced wherever the person may be found. But as the only source of
this obligation is the law of the place of the act, it follows that the law determines
not merely the existence of the obligation . . . but equally determines it extent.
(Citations omitted.)
Wolens, supra note 2, at 414.
'RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1934): "(1) If a cause of action in tort is
created at the place of wrong, a cause of action will be recognized in other states. (2) If no cause
of action is created at the place of wrong, no recovery in tort can be had in any other state."
"Id. 5 s85.
8 Id. § 612.
9See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 42, 172 N.E.2d 526, 539, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133, 137 (1961) (damage limitation classified as procedural); Walton School of Commerce v.
Stroud, 248 Mich. 84, 226 N.W. 883 (1929); Dorr Cattle Co. v. Des Moines Nat'l Bank, 127
Iowa 153, 98 N.W. 918 (1904).
'0 In Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955), a question arose concerning
intrafamilial immunity, and a child was permitted to recover from his parent under the law of
the domicle. Applciation of lex loci would have resulted in a denial of recovery. See also Pacific
Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) (workmen's compensation);
Hartness v. Aldens, Inc., 301 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1962) (public policy); Haumschild v. Con-
tinental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959) (marital relationship); Grant v.
McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) (decedents estate law); and Levy v. Daniels'
U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 At. 163 (1928) (contract action instead of tort).
"In Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133, 135 (1961), the court stated that
An air traveler from New York may in a flight of a few hours duration pass through
several of those commonwealths. His plane may meet with disaster in a state he
never intended to cross but into which the plane has flown because of bad weather
or other unexpected developments, or an airplane's catostrophic descent may begin in
one state and end in another. The place of injury becomes entirely fortuitous.
There, the court applied the policy that the law of the domicile rather than that of the state
in which the injury occurred should govern the rights of the litigants. However, the law of the
state where the accident occurred may be held to have the most significant interest. In Dym v.
Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965), both parties were New
York domiciliaries and were spending the summer in Colorado when the accident occurred. In
holding that the Colorado Guest Statute governed the rights of the parties, the court said that since
these parties had come to rest in Colorado, "they had chosen to live their daily lives under the
protective arm of Colorado law." 209 N.E.2d at 795.
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ment was Babcock v. Jackson," wherein the New York Court of Appeals
rejected the doctrine which gave each state exclusive sovereignty and juris-
diction within its own territory to control every transaction carried on
within the state. They reasoned that this doctrine did not take into account
the practical considerations, as well as the legitimate interests, of other
jurisdictions.
From the Babcock decision forward, the highest courts of many states
have decided to break with tradition and to apply rules of law whereby
the interests of all jurisdictions can be considered in light of each other in
an effort to find the law which should determine the rights and liabilities
of the parties." Similarly, in 1966 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
chose to adopt and follow the second Restatement, 4 which made the
law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the oc-
currence and with the parties involved determinitive as to the parties'
rights and liabilities."s According to the Restatement, the court in making
this determination is to consider the issues involved, the character of the
tort, and the relevant purposes behind the laws of the interested states.
In another recent case, Clark v. Clark," the court accepted this interest-
oriented approach over the traditional lex loci delicti rule, and set down
specific considerations to guide the court's determination of which state
law to apply. No single consideration is to be given paramount importance
in this determination, but the court should weigh each factor in the light
of all the others.' The first of these considerations is the predictability of
results. Adoption of a predictable choice of law protects the justifiable
expectations of the parties. It also assures uniformity of decision regardless
of forum, thus discouraging "forum shopping."" A second consideration
12 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 742 (1963). In 1954 the New York court
in Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954), had recognized a similar inflexibility
of the conflict-of-laws rules in the field of contracts and adopted in its place a most significant
contacts theory. This theory weighs the contacts and interests of the respective jurisdictions to
determine the specific bearing these matters have on the issue before the court.
"5 This conclusion was reached by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Griffith v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). In that case the plaintiff was enroute from
Philadelphia to Phoenix, Arizona, when the defendant's airplane crashed in Colorado and the
plaintiff was killed. Suit was brought in Pennsylvania, where the plaintiff sought to apply the
Pennsylvania law, there being a higher measure of damages in that state than in Colorado. The
court said that Pennsylvania's interest in the amount of recovery of its citizens was far greater
than Colorado's interest, which it termed "purely fortuitous." In overruling the doctrine of lex
loci delicti, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the more flexible rule which calls for apply-
ing the law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the events surrounding
the tort and with the parties. In 1966 the Minnesota Supreme Court also decided to depart from
the traditional doctrine of lex loci delicti. It recently handed down decisions in the cases of
Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 141 N.W.2d 526 (Minn. 1966) and Balts v. Baits, 142 N.W.2d 66 (Minn.
1966) in which it stated that it
would weigh the interests of the domicilory state, whether Minnesota or otherwise,
to the extent it is constitutionally permissible, against any peculiar concern the state
of the tort or the forum state will have. Such an approach will reflect all of the
factors relevant to the issues rather than blindly defer to the state which may have
experienced only a trivial and transitory brush with the parties to the litigation.
142 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1966).
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379(1) & (3) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964).
s Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781 (1966).
1107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
17 The following considerations are taken directly from the opinion of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court in Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205-09 (1966).
Is Id. at 208.
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is the maintenance of reasonable orderliness and good relationship among
the states in our federal system. Open disregard for another state's interests
is violative of the federal system; therefore, each court must refrain from
applying the law of a state which does not have a substantial connection
with the total facts and with the particular issue being litigated. Simplifi-
cation of the judicial administration of the forum is a third consideration.
It may well be easier for a court which applies its own procedural rules to
apply its own substantive law also, for it understands its own law better
and therefore could do a better job of administering justice under it.
A fourth consideration is inherent in the obvious fact that every court is
more concerned with the advancement of its own state governmental
interests than with those of other states. A state may have a strong public
policy which differs from a sister-state viewpoint. While this occasionally
happens and must be considered, in most instances the only real interest
that a state government has is that of fair and efficient administration of
justice. Finally, a fifth consideration, too often disguised, is the court's
preference for what it regards as the sounder rule of law, as between the
competing ones. Thus, the Clark court recognized the principle that each
court should, and will, determine what it considers to be the law that
should govern a particular case and not merely which jurisdiction is best
suited to decide it. If the law of some other state is antiquated, then the
court should apply its own law instead. If it is its own law which is obso-
lete, then another state's law might be applicable. This sort of determi-
nation was not relevant under the automatic lex loci-vested interests test.
Clark and other recent cases indicate, then, that the courts no longer feel
constrained to adhere to lex loci delecti; consequently, there is no longer
a need "to stretch the loopholes of the system to achieve a just result in
particular cases."19
A particularly unique situation was presented in the case at bar when
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted a new rule after the instant case
had been tried but while appeal was pending. Throughout the course of
the trial the parties had assumed lex loci to be the only applicable rule
and did not argue otherwise at the trial. On appeal, the plaintiff asserted
for the first time the right to have the case decided under the recently
changed rule of law.* The defendant objected on the ground that the
plaintiff had not asserted this right at the trial and had thus waived any
right it had to bring it up on appeal." Ordinarily, an appellate court will
not review matters which were not raised below,22 but here the appellate
court was also faced with the principle that it must apply the law as it
" Wolens, supra note 2, at 413.
" The plaintiff maintained that it would be too much to expect lawyers and litigants not only
to preserve error as to mistakes under the then applicable law, but also to anticipate future changes
in the law.
" The defendant contended that the plaintiff had a right to argue, but did not, the rationale
that the law of lex loci delicti did not always apply. He asserted that the plaintiffs had done
this in the Griffith case. The defendant admitted that if the plaintiff had objected to the applica-
tion of Georgia law when the case was tried, he would have been entitled to the benefit, if any,
of the rule set forth in the Griffith case.
'In re Erie Drug Co., 416 Pa. 41, 204 A.2d 256 (1964).
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currently exists.' Although there are no cases in Pennsylvania which have
dealt with the effect of a change in decisional law pending appeal, there
is a general accord among other jurisdictions that an appellate court will
apply a change in law to all pending cases.' In Chase v. American Cartage
Co.' the trial court had entered judgment based on the Wisconsin law
existing at the time of trial, which imputed a driver's negligence to a guest
passenger. Pending appeal, this decisional rule was changed by the Wis-
consin Supreme Court to the effect that there would no longer be im-
putation of negligence in such a case. The court in Chase said: "A lawful
change in judicial rule not amounting to a rule of property or its equiv-
alent by a court of last resort becomes effective at once and thereafter,
upon subsequent appeals, operates alike upon acts coming within it whether
occurring before or after its commencement." ' Likewise, in Board of
Pub. Instruction v. Budget Comm'n,"7 the court stated that it was com-
pelled to take judicial notice of its own decisions and that justice required
that the case at bar be decided in the light of a recent change in the law."s
Moreover, in a related instance, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has
held that it will decide a case on appeal from a federal district court in
the light of a change in the decisional law by the state supreme court,
where the jurisdiction of the district court was based on diversity."
In view of the rule adopted in other jurisdictions, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania held that unless the rights of the litigants are vested and
will be adversely affected, the latest decision is applicable to a case
that has not completed its course through judicial appeal." An addi-
tional consideration was given to the fact that the court had on prior
occasions" given the benefit of a change in the law in order to pre-
vent injustice, especially where the parties could not have changed
their position in reliance on the trial court decision. The court stated s2
' Shaw v. Village of Hempstead, 20 App. Div. 2d 663, 246 N.Y.S.2d 557, 558 (1964).
"See American Reciprocal Insurers v. Bessonette, 241 Ore. 500, 405 P.2d 529 (1965); Shaw v.
Village of Hempstead, 20 App. Div. 2d 663, 246 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1964); Yates v. St. John's Beach
Dev. Co., 122 Fla. 141, 165 So. 384 (1935); Lober v. Kansas City, 74 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. 1934);
and Chase v. American Cartage Co., 176 Wis. 235, 186 N.W. 598 (1922).
25 176 Wis. 235, 186 N.W. 598 (1922).2 Id. at 599.
27 167 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1964).
21 Id. at 306.29 Abraham v. National Biscuit Co., 89 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1937). In addition, the effect of
overruling a decision is retrospective as well as prospective. Buradus v. General Cement Prods.
Co., 356 Pa. 549, 52 A.2d 205 (1947), affirming 159 Pa. Super. 501, 48 A.2d 883 (1946); City
of Philadelphia v. Schaller, 148 Pa. Super. 276, 25 A.2d 406 (1942).
" The Pennsylvania court relied on its previous decision in a closely related field, i.e., statutory
interpretation. See Buradus v. General Cement Prods. Co., 159 Pa. Super. 501, 48 A.2d 883
(1946), aff'd, 356 Pa. 349, 52 A.2d 205 (1947).
as In re Reamer's Estate, 331 Pa. 117, 200 Atl. 35 (1938), where the court corrected a decision
in a previous appeal of the same case which had been made palpably erroneous by an intervening
decision; and more recently in Brubaker v. Reading Eagle Co., 422 Pa. 63, 221 A.2d 190 (1966),
where the court ordered a new trial to permit the plaintiff to bring his allegations within the
actual malice requirement of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Although
Brubaker the plaintiff was deprived of his original verdict by a change in the law, the case illus-
trates the court's objective of assuring each litigant a fair adjudication on the merits.
3' 222 A.2d at 901. See also Lobalzo v. Varoli, 422 Pa. 5, 220 A.2d 634 (1966); Bell v. Yellow
Cab Co., 399 Pa. 332, 160 A.2d 437 (1960).
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that the effective administration of justice requires that a litigant either
raise all his objections at trial or be deemed to have waived them on appeal.
But the court recognized that in the instant case this would have been to
no avail, for under the prevailing law at the time of the trial the plaintiff
did all that could be reasonably expected. It would only have a deterrent
effect on the administration of justice if the plaintiff were required to
urge every conceivable theory it could think of at the trial stage, for the
court would then be required to consider and rule on each theory.
Having determined that the plaintiff had not waived his right to assert at
the appellate level a change in the law affecting his position, the court
then decided which substantive law should apply to the instant case.
In its decision on this point, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court chose to
follow the same rationale that it applied in the Griffith" case, i.e., that the
forum with the most significant contacts should control the substantive
law. This court, as have many others," recognized the fact that there are
many factual situations in which more than one jurisdiction has contacts
with the transaction. It is in determining which law to apply that it must
decide which contacts are nominal and which are substantial. The Pennsyl-
vania court recognized that Georgia in enacting its Guest Statute had a
valid purpose," but this is just one of the factors which are to be considered.
Others are the place of domicile of the parties (here Pennsylvania), where
the transaction was entered into (here Pennsylvania), and where it was
intended to terminate (here Pensylvania). Furthermore, Pennsylvania had
a definite interest in the settlement of the estates of its four deceased
residents. The court found that Georgia's only contact with the present
case was as situs of the accident and was wholly fortuitous, whereas
Pennsylvania was the state with the most significant interest in defining
the legal consequences adhering to the relationship here involved.'
Thus, the deterioration of the doctrine of lex loci delicti, while relatively
lethargic at first, is becoming a more rapidly moving process. Although
much concern has been expressed "7 about giving power to one state to
apply its substantive laws to actions which arise beyond its territorial
' Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
" See, e.g., McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel,
249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957); and Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944
(1953).
as In passing its statute, Georgia undoubtedly intended either to protect insurance companies
from collusive suits or to prevent ungrateful guests from suing their hosts. Kuchinic v. McCrory,
222 A.2d at 900-01.
3o Id. at 900.
" Many recent articles have been written concerning the relative merits of lex loci delicti and
that of dominant interests. See, e.g., Wolens, supra note 2; O'Rourke, A Numerical Evaluation of
Babcock, 37 N.Y.S.B.J. 243 (1965); Webb and Brownlie, Survival of Actions in Tort and the
Conflict of Laws, 14 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 1 (1965); and Ker, New York and the Conflict of Laws:
A Retreat, 18 STAN. L. REv. 699 (1966). See generally Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the
Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 959 (1952); Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A
Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1233 (1963); and Keeffe,
Piercing Pearson, 29 J. Al, L. & CoM. 95 (1963).
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limits,3s the trend is definitely in that direction. This more flexible approach
enables the court where the suit is filed to consider all the factors involved
before determining which of two or more competing state interests is to
govern the substantive rights of the parties. Clark and Kuchinic are proper
steps in the direction of breaking down a system which no longer has a
place in our increasingly complex society characterized by its many multi-
state transactions. In addition, Kuchinic indicates that when a state supreme
court adopts a new conflicts rule, the new rule can be argued in a case that
is on appeal, notwithstanding the fact that only the traditional rule was in
effect and argued below.
Ben J. Kerr III
"SEx parte First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Co., 247 S.C. 506, 148 S.E.2d 373 (1966).
The court there set down, in an automobile collision case, that " 'as an elementary principle, that
the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by
comity; & that no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so far
as to subject either persons or property to its decisions.'" (quoting from Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714, 722 (1877)).
19671
International Law-The Three Mile Limit or More-
It's Anyone's Guess
An action was brought against the Employers Mutual Casualty Com-
pany by Mrs. Eugene W. Samuels to recover on an insurance policy issued
by that company on the life of her husband. Mr. Samuels was an officer
of a Texas corporation, which had subscribed to the Texas Workmen's
Compensation Act and had obtained a Workmen's Compensation insur-
ance policy containing a voluntary compensation endorsement specifically
covering Mr. Samuels. The insurance company agreed to pay if Samuels
sustained death or injury "in the United States of America, its territories
or possessions, or Canada." Samuels was killed in an airplane crash twenty-
one miles out in the Gulf of Mexico east of Port Isabel, Texas. The par-
ties stipulated that the only issue was whether Samuels was killed within
the United States. Held: The "territorial waters" of the United States ex-
tend three marine leagues' from the state of Texas into the Gulf of Mex-
ico. The sea beyond the territorial waters, the "high sea," forms no part of
the territory of any nation. Therefore, the death in the instant case did
not occur within the United States or its territories or possessions. Employ-
ers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Samuels, 407 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
Sovereign powers have traditionally claimed ownership of the waters
surrounding their shores; however, it has also been generally recognized
that international law limits the marginal sea which is subject to the con-
trol and sovereignty of the contiguous State. Beyond this point, the mar-
ginal or territorial sea becomes the high sea, over which no State can claim
ownership, sovereignty or jurisdiction.! The most widely recognized sea-
ward boundary, the three-mile limit,3 had its inception in the remote past
and is, in all probability, an outgrowth of the principle, described by
Bynkershoek in 1703, that:
a state can take possession of the waters washing its shores and hold such
adversely against the world, as far as it can control and make that possession
effective by cannon from its shores,-that therefore, to the extent of the
cannon-shot from shore, marginal waters are subject to possession, occupation
and, therefore, ownership.4
Somehow the range of a cannon shot was eventually translated into a dis-
1 Three marine leagues equals nine nautical miles or 10.359 statute miles.
'United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); The Vences, 20 F.2d 164 (E.D.S.C. 1927),
aff'd, 27 F.2d 296 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 635 (1928); Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 100, 122-24 (1923); The Mariana Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1 (1826). For an extensive
and well written article on the history and development of the three mile limit see Heizen, The
Tbree-Mile Limit: Preserving the Freedom of the Seas, 11 STAN. L. REV. 597 (1959).
'Texas and Florida have a nine mile or three league limit. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S.
1 (1960).4J. Scott, Introduction to BYNKERSHOEK, DE DOMINO MARIS 17 (Scott ed. 1923).
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tance of three miles5 and "by 1900 the three-mile or one [marine] league
limit had been positively adopted or acknowledged as law by twenty of the
twenty-one states [of the world] which claimed or acknowledged a terri-
torial sea at that time."'
In more recent times, the problem has become more acute in the inter-
national legal arena and has been under consideration by international
bodies. In 1930, the Hague Conference for the Progressive Codification of
International Law failed to adopt a uniform territorial limit for nations
with coastal boundaries.' The International Law Commission meeting, held
prior to the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958,' found that
although there was no uniformity among States as to the extent of the ter-
ritorial sea, international law should not permit a territorial sea beyond
twelve miles. Moreover, it was noted that some States have adopted boun-
daries of greater or less than three miles. The Commission then recommend-
ed that the limit of the territorial sea should be fixed by internal confer-
ence.' At the 1958 Geneva Conference the United States was firmly con-
vinced that the three mile limit was not only well established, but that it
was the most advantageous for all nations. However, the United States ex-
pressed its willingness to explore other possibilities and finally offered a
compromise proposal that the territorial sea be extended to six miles, with
the right of the coastal states to regulate fishing for another six miles sub-
ject to certain historical fishing rights. This proposal failed to receive the re-
guired two-thirds of the votes needed to pass. Thus, despite the findings of
s Bynkershoek never mentioned the range of the cannon, when he declared that a nation could
exercise its sovereignty over waters within the cannon range of shore, and at the time of his state-
ment it might be noted that no existing cannon had a range of three miles. MOUTON, THE CON-
TINENTAL SHELF 195-98 (1952). Nevertheless cannon range eventually came "to be used as the
equivalent of three miles; even though the measure of three miles was not used as the equivalent
of cannon range." Heizen, The Three-Mile Limit: Preserving the Freedom of the Seas, 11 STAN.
L. REv. 597, 618 (1959). An impression was created that there is a territorial belt three miles
wide extending out from the shores of nations which is in their control and jurisdiction. Thus,
the three mile limit has taken the place of the cannon-shot rule on the "statute book of the modern
maritime world," although certain European nations did attempt to claim a distance greater than
three miles from their shores. Walker, Territorial Waters: The Cannon Shot Rule, 22 BRIT. YB.
INT'L L. 210, 231 (1945). In 1691, Denmark declared a neutrality zone off its coasts. Denmark
claimed that territorial waters extended to the limits of eyesight, or four or five leagues from the
shores. At this point France had long adhered to the cannon-shot rule. However, the French were
willing to allow a belt narrower than four leagues. One source has described the meeting between
the two countries as follows:
It is probable that in these negotiations we find the meeting-place of two distinct
currents of practice. On the one hand, there is the practice of France and other
Powers as to neutrality in war-time, based on cannon range of actual cannon, i.e.,
protection to be given to those seeking refuge. . . .On the other hand, there is the
practice of the Northern Powers of Europe fixing a territorial coastal belt measured
by mileage-a practice which appears to have far more in common with the later
three mile limit than does the cannon range doctrine. Walker, supra at 216.
Denmark and France never reached an agreement as to the limit of the territorial waters in
question; consequently, Denmark maintained its four or five leagues until 1745, when the King
of Denmark reduced the neutrality zone of Denmark to one league. RIESENFELD, PROTECTION OF
COASTAL FISHERIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 209, 211 (1942).
'Heizen, The Three-Mile Limit: Preserving the Freedom of the Seas, 11 STAN. L. REv. 597,
632 (1959).
'Id. at 637.
'Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished, 52 AM. J.
INT'L L. 607 (1958).
9Id. at 614.
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the preliminary International Law Commission and the recommendations
of the United States, the Geneva Conference failed to set a uniform limit
upon the territorial sea."0 A second Geneva Conference was held in 1960,
but again no positive action was taken. As a consequence of the lack of
a clear international law limit upon ownership of the marginal sea, many
nations have considered themselves free to establish unilaterally their own
boundaries. For instance, several South American nations claim ownership
of up to two hundred miles of their contiguous waters.1" Thus, there seems
to be no effective international law limit upon a sovereign's power to de-
clare ownership of its contiguous waters.
It is, then, apparently within the power of the sovereign to declare the
point at which its seaward boundaries end and, correspondingly, the dis-
tance from its shores at which the "high sea" begins. In 1793 the United
States by promulgation of the executive department adopted the three
mile limit. 3 The following year, Congress enacted a statute which required
the federal district courts to "take cognizance of complaints by whomso-
ever instituted, in cases of captures made within the waters of the United
States, or within a marine league of the coasts or shores thereof."14 This
statute marked the first instance of legislative recognition of the three mile
limit. More than one hundred years later the Supreme Court, in Cunard
S. S. Co. v. Mellon, stated: "It is now settled in the United States that...
the territory subject to its jurisdiction includes ... a marginal belt of the
sea extending from the coast line outward a marine league, or three geo-
graphic miles." 2
Due to subsequent executive and legislative actions, however, this rather
definite statement as to the applicability of the three mile limit to the
United States is now subject to question. That is, several recently enacted
statutes may be interpreted as extensions of the boundaries of the United
States. The first of these statutes followed on the heels of three Supreme
Court decisions" in which the Court held that the submerged lands off the
shores of sea-side states belonged to the Federal Government. Congress
yielded to the outraged cries of the states having boundaries on the sea
and granted these states title to the submerged lands off their shores. In
doing so, however, Congress established inconsistent boundaries for the
various sea-side states by the passage of the Submerged Lands Act." It de-
10 Ibid.
" Manley, The Geneva Conferences on the Law of the Sea as a Step in the International Law
Making Process, 25 ALBANY L. REv. 17 (1961).
12 Heizen, The Three-Mile Limit: Preserving the Freedom of the Seas, 11 STAN. L. REv. 597,
644 (1959).
1 A note was sent to the British Minister, Mr. Hammon, on 8 November 1793, by Secretary
of State Jefferson, informing him that the United States claimed the one marine league or the three
mile limit as the boundary of the United States. 1 MOORE, DIcEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 702-03
(1906).
14Act of 5 June 1794, ch. 50, § 6, 1 Stat. 384 (1845).
5262 U.S. 100, 122-24 (1922).
"
6 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 67 Stat. 462 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1964);
Submerged Lands Act, 67 Star. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-13 (1964).
17United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699
(1950); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
"
0Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. 5§ 1301, 1312 (1964).
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fined the boundaries in terms of those existing at the time each state became
a member of the union or as later approved by Congress, but it put a
limit on the distance to which the boundaries could extend, i.e., not more
than one marine league into the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans nor more
than three marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico. Thus, Texas and Flor-
ida, the only states bordering on the Gulf that claimed more than three
miles when they became states, " acquired a limit of three leagues under
the Submerged Lands Act, whereas all other coastal states acquired one
league boundaries. This apparent inconsistent treatment of state boun-
daries presents two areas of uncertainty with respect to the presently ef-
fective boundaries of the United States: (1) does the United States now
claim ownership of three leagues of territorial waters off the shores of
Texas and Florida; and (2) has the United States now effectively abro-
gated the three mile limit for the entire nation and substituted in its place
a three league limit? In extending the boundaries of the states of Texas and
Florida to three leagues into the marginal sea, the act would seem to
amount to an assertion of United States sovereignty, for otherwise the
Federal Government would not have been able to make the grant. Corre-
spondingly, this principle would apply to waters that lie off the shores of
states other than Texas and Florida as limited by the Submerged Lands Act.
It would seem, then, that the marginal sea between three miles and three
leagues from the shores of states other than Texas and Florida, not having
been granted to the adjacent states, is subject to the sovereignty of the
Federal Government. It must be noted, however, that the executive de-
partment at least, still subscribes to the three mile limit-witness the 1958
Geneva Conference"°-so that no conclusion can presently be reached as to
whether the Submerged Lands Act is an effective declaration that the
United States now claims a territorial sea of three leagues.
A 195 3 statute, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act," extended fur-
ther the federal ownership of resources in the submerged lands. This act was
a codification of the Presidential Proclamation of 1945, 2 which asserted
federal control of the resources of the continental shelf of the United
States, i.e., the animal and mineral resources of the seabed contiguous to its
shores. However, it was expressly provided that the high seas and air above
them would in no way be affected and that free and unimpeded navigation
would exist. The "continental self" refers to a continuous land mass of
the submerged sea which is nothing more than an extension of the land
into the sea, usually at a depth of less than 200 meters." The act declared
that it was "to be the policy of the United States that the subsoil and sea-
bed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United States and
are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition .... .
"United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960); United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 36-65
(1960); Gross, The Maritime Boundaries of the States, 64 MICH. L. REv. 639, 642 (1966).
20 Dean, supra note 8.
"Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 67 Stat. 462 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1331-43 (1964).
"13 DEP'T STATE BULL. 485 (1945).
"Employers Mut. Gas. Co. v. Samuels, 407 S.W.2d 839, 842 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
'
4 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 67 Stat. 462 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1331-43 (1964).
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Its primary purpose was to assert ownership of and jurisdiction over the
subsoil and seabed, as well as the artificial islands and fixed structures
thereon. A case which considered the nature of the Continental Shelf Act,
is Guess v. Read,' in which a helicopter crashed off the coast of Louisiana
at a distance of nine miles. The court in that case held that the accident
occurred outside the boundaries of the United States because the boun-
daries of Louisiana only extended to a distance of three miles. In dis-
cussing the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act the court held that the sub-
soil and seabed did not include the sea and the air above the continental
shelf; therefore, the United States had no sovereignty over that part of the
sea in which the accident occurred because this was deemed to be part of
the high seas. Thus, this statute does not seem to be an effective extension
of sovereignty of the United States, because the sea above the continental
shelf is expressly excluded from the control of the Government.
In addition to the Submerged Lands Act and the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, a recently enacted statute asserted a degree of federal
control over the marginal sea. This act granted United States fishermen
the right to an exclusive fisheries zone extending twelve miles from the
coastal shores of the coastal states." The statute resulted from the fact that
during the months preceeding its enactment, "there has been a tremend-
ous increase in the taking of fishery resources .. .within 12 miles of U.S.
shores."2 It was felt that these limited fishing resources should be pro-
tected. Under the statute, the United States has the right to exercise the
same exclusive rights in respect to fisheries in this zone as it does in its ter-
ritorial sea. It could be argued that this statute amounts to an assertion of
ownership of twelve miles of contiguous sea; however, it appears that the
degree of control to be exercised by the Government over the waters
themselves is not so extensive as to amount to ownership thereof.
Thus, Congress has apparently extended the boundaries of the United
States to three leagues into the marginal sea by passing the Submerged
Lands Act, but there is seemingly no effective extension of full sovereign
rights past that point. Moreover, it now seems to be conclusively estab-
lished that the states themselves have no power to extend their boun-
daries past those established by Congress.28 For instance, California at-
tempted to make all of the area in the Santa Barbara Channel within its
boundaries, but a federal court held that it could not extend its boundaries
past the three mile limit." Another court on the same situation held that
the waters off the state of Hawaii lying more than three miles from the
mainland and from the islands consist of waters of the high seas and not
"5290 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 957 (1962).
26 80 Stat. 908 (1966), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1091 (1966).
21 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3284 (1966).
28 United States v. California, 363 U.S. 1, 51 (1960); 1 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES 407-25 (2d ed. 1929); BURDICK, LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
272-82 (1922).2 5 Hooker v. Raytheon Co., 212 F. Supp. 687 (S.D. Calif. 1962).
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the territorial waters of Hawaii.' The Court in United States v. Louisiana,"'
voiced the rule that only Congress can establish a state's boundaries:
The power to admit new states resides in Congress. The President on the
other hand, is the constitutional representative of the United States in its
dealings with foreign nations. From the former springs the power to establish
state boundaries; from the latter comes the power to determine how far this
country will claim territorial rights in the marginal sea as against other na-
tions. It is sufficient for purposes to note that there is no question of Con-
gress' power to fix state land and water boundaries as a domestic matter.
In the present case the insurance policy covered the deceased if he was
killed within the boundaries of the United States," but the accident oc-
curred twenty-one miles off the coast of Texas. Since the accident happened
over that portion of the continental shelf of the United States which is
outside the three league limit, it is evident that the deceased died out-
side the United States. The boundary of Texas is set at three marine
leagues, and all waters past that point are considered the high seas. The
plaintiff argued that a Texas statute"8 extending the boundaries of Texas
to twenty-seven marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico correspondingly
extended the boundaries of the United States to that point. The court
noted to the contrary that only Congress can extend a state's boundaries
and that the Federal Government has "consistently maintained the position
that such waters [the waters above the continental shelf ]-are part of the
high seas and, therefore, subject to the control of no nation."' Therefore,
the Texas statute could not have had the effect of establishing United
States ownership of the marginal sea up to twenty-seven miles from the
Texas coast. An accident that occurs twenty-one miles from the Texas
coast, then, does not occur within the United States. It remains to be
decided, however, just how far the seaward boundaries of the United
States actually do extend. The Submerged Lands Act apparently signals
federal ownership of the marginal waters of three leagues, and it is pos-
sible that the recent fishing statute could be interpreted as a federal as-
sertion of ownership of twelve miles of marginal sea.
Lawrence R. Jones, Jr.
C AB v. Island Airlines, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 990 (D. Hawaii 1964).
3 United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 35 (1960).
32 To some extent it is well established that the states may exercise their authority over their
citizens on the high seas. Skirtoes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941). It has been held that a birth
on the high seas did not occur within the United States, thus it is difficult to see how a death on
the high seas may be considered to be within the United States. Law Mow v. Nagle, 24 F.2d 316
(9th Cir. 1928).
'TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN., art. 5415a (1962).




Airport Lease Agreement -Reasonableness -
Injunctive Relief
In 1964 United Airlines and other carriers entered into a lease agree-
ment with the Port of New York Authority covering the use by United
and the others of the facilities at LaGuardia Airport. United agreed,
among other things, "to observe and obey all rules and regulations which
may from time to time during the term hereof be promulgated and en-
forced by the Port Authority. . . ." The Port Authority had then in
force a set of rules and regulations, including a rule prohibiting the use
of any airport by jet aircraft without its permission. The Port Authority
had, pursuant to certain agreements with the FAA, undertaken to extend
runways 4-22 and runways 13-31 to accommodate jet aircraft. On 9
April 1964, prior to the extension of the runways, United and the other
airlines, requested permission of the Port Authority to operate its jets
on runways 4-22 and 13-31, asserting that prior to the completion of
the extended runways, they did not propose to conduct 727 operations
on runways 4-22 unless the Port Authority and the airlines had agreed
that operations could be conducted on these runways at tolerable noise
levels. Thereafter, the Port Authority granted each airline such permission
on the condition that use of these runways would be permitted only if
the flights were planned so as not to exceed a specified noise level in the
communities underlying the flight path. The airlines conducted no take-
offs or landings on these runways during the following two years. In the
spring of 1966, when the work on runways 4-22 was completed but work
was continuing on 13-31, the FAA authorized aircraft to use runways
4-22 pursuant to a Tower Bulletin which established a preferential run-
way system for LaGuardia Airport, and required each pilot to use the
preferential runway assigned to him by the FAA Air Traffic Control
Tower unless the pilot requested and obtained a different clearance.'
However, by designating these runways as available, the FAA was not
directing that the runways be used. The Port Authority quickly notified
United and the other airlines that the Port Authority had not given per-
mission to use runways 4-22 for 727 activity and that the terms of the
agreement between the Port Authority and United were still in effect.
1 The FAA bulletin established that runways 4-22 would be the last priority but that planes
would not be directed to use the preferential runways when certain adverse conditions existed or
when the reported surface wind is in excess of a fifteen knot cross wind component.
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During the month of August 1966, each of the defendant airlines per-
formed take-offs and landings from runways 4-22 at the direction of the
FAA Air Traffic Control Tower. The Port Authority asked for a federal
decree enjoining the defendant airlines from using runways 4-22 until
the completion of runways 13-31, alleging that the airlines had agreed
to abide by the regulations of the Port Authority and not to use runways
4-22 for jet aircraft operations prior to the extension of both runways
4-22 and runways 13-31. The airlines answered that they had agreed
to abide by "reasonable" regulations of the Port Authority but that the
regulations have become unreasonable and that there was no reason to
await the completion of runways 13-31 before permitting the use of
runways 4-22. Held, injunction issued: When dealing with a quasi-public
corporation with the experience and expertise of the Port Authority, it
is not for the court to substitute its judgment for that of the Port
Authority. The court's function is only to determine, in the light of all
the circumstances, whether the particular regulation was so unreasonable
as to violate the understanding between the parties. Under the circum-
stances, the regulations in question were found to be still reasonable since
they (1) abated the aircraft noise in the area affected, (2) restricted the
airlines for only a short time until the work on the other runways was
completed, and (3) the Port Authority made available appropriate and
safe runways at Kennedy or Newark when crosswinds at LaGuardia pro-
hibited the use of all but runways 4-22. Port of New York Authority v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
The opinion considers the agreement between the Port Authority and
the airlines as a restrictive covenant limiting the airlines' use of the run-
ways under their lease. This characterization lends support to the opinion
in that (1) a covenant in the lease runs between the airlines and the
Port Authority only so that their rights are not affected by any action
of the FAA, and (2) the violation here is in the category of a technical
trespass upon real property so that the landlord is entitled to injunctive
relief against a tenant who violates such a covenant without showing
irreparable damage or loss. The court does, however, imply a further
standard: the regulations which become part of the covenant must be
"not unreasonable"' to be entitled to enforcement in equity. This last
reservation apparently applies when the terms of the covenant are regula-
tions of some quasi-public corporation or agent.
Although the FAA has the authority to regulate the flight of aircraft
through the navigable airspace of the United States, the fact that the
FAA gave the option to the pilot to request a new clearance when directed
to use certain runways was seized upon as evidence that the FAA did
not intend to pre-empt the Port Authority in regulation of air carriers'
use of the runway facilities. The court buttressed this conclusion by noting
that the FAA had made no effort to intervene in the suit. The implica-
tion is that had the FAA chosen to intervene, the court would have
'Cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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afforded it controlling weight. Such an implication recognizes the language
of Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst' which held that the
federal regulatory system has pre-empted the field, at least where the
federal scheme conflicts with a municipal ordinance. The court distin-
guished the instant case on the basis that there was no actual conflict here
between the FAA's directions and the Port Authority's regulations since
the carriers could always request a clearance to use an alternate airport
when conditions were such at LaGuardia that the FAA, in the promo-
tion of safety, would allow only the use of runways 4-22. The Authority's
adherence to its position under the agreement may have inconvenienced
the carriers involved to some extent, but it is not a sufficiently direct
conflict that it necessitates nullification, particularly when the municipal
regulations are included in the terms of a lease freely entered into by
the parties.
J.D.R.
Collisions, - Air Traffic Control - Government Liability
Action was brought against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act to recover damages for wrongful death and destruction of
property resulting from a collision between a military and a commercial
airplane. The plaintiff alleged that the pilot of the government aircraft
was negligent in his performance and that this was the proximate cause
of the crash. In addition, the plaintiff maintained that the government
employees operating the Washington Control Center, which was guiding
the commercial airplane, were also negligent in failure to maintain a
proper lookout and in failing to give warning of approaching aircraft,
and that their negligence was likewise one of the proximate causes of the
accident. Held: Both the pilot, individually, and the United States were
guilty of actionable negligence, such concurrent negligence being the
proximate cause of the crash. Maryland v. United States, 257 F. Supp.
768 (D.D.C. 1966).
The actions of the government pilot in negligently causing the collision
with the commercial airplane was held to be beyond the scope of his
employment and, accordingly, the government could not be held liable
for his actions on the basis of respondeat superior. The government was
liable, however, for the actions of its employees at the Control Center.
These employees violated their duty to use due diligence in observing and
detecting on the radarscope any traffic or obstructions in the vicinity of
the aircraft being controlled (i.e., the commercial airplane) and to im-
mediately warn the pilot of any impending danger. The historic function
of air traffic control is to avoid collisions between airborne planes. While
this duty is not absolute as yet, and while the government cannot be
3238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
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considered as an insurer of safety, due care must nevertheless be exercised
to discharge it adequately. In a case such as this, it has long been the
rule that injuries or damages may be the consequence of the concurrent
negligence of two or more persons and that the negligence of each may
be a proximate cause of the result. Under such circumstances, each negli-
gent person, or his employer, as the case may be, is liable for the total
damages incurred. Here, both the pilot, in his individual capacity, and
the government, through the failure of its employees to give proper
warning, are liable for the entire amount of damages awarded.
B.J.K. III
Airman's Certificate - Multi-engine Rating - Suspension
While petitioner was the holder of an airman's certificate with com-
mercial pilot privileges and airplane single-engine land and instrument
ratings, he took instructions in flying twin-engine aircraft. Upon com-
pletion of the instructions, the flight instructor endorsed in the petitioner's
log book that he was ready for a multi-engine rating flight test. There-
after, the petitioner made three appointments for the flight test. For
some reason the inspector assigned for the first test was unable to give
it. The second test was cancelled because of bad weather conditions,
and the petitioner failed to appear at the time designated for the
third appointment. Though petitioner failed to secure a multi-engine
rating as required, he flew a multi-engine airplane from Chicago to
Naples, Florida, accompanied by his wife, mother-in-law, two daughters,
and a domestic servant. During his return flight with the same people
on board, he encountered icing conditions and the aircraft crashed, killing
four of the occupants and seriously injuring the petitioner. Petitioner
seeks to review a CAB order which suspended his pilot's certificate for
six months by asserting that he was, in fact, qualified for multi-engine air-
craft, but that the FAA unreasonably frustrated his efforts to take the
necessary flight test, and, moreover, that the word "passengers" in section
61.131 (b)' of the Regulations, which he allegedly violated, means fare-
paying passengers only-thus excluding him from the application of
that provision. Held, affirmed: A pilot cannot be permitted to disregard
licensing requirements. The term "passengers" in the applicable regulation
includes non-paying members of a pilot's family and the domestic servant
who accompanied them. Somlo v. CAB, 367 F.2d 791 (7th Cir. 1966).
Petitioner contended that as he was qualified for a multi-engine rating,
'At the time of appellant's violation, section 61.131(b) provided:
A commercial pilot may not serve as pilot in command of an aircraft carrying
passengers or operated for remuneration other than one of the category and class
for which he is rated, and in the case of large aircraft, of the type for which he is
rated. 27 Fed. Reg. 7965 (1962).
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that issuance of that rating was a mere formality, and that he would have
received his rating but for the unreasonable and arbitrary refusal to
give him his test. If the court upheld these contentions, anyone who
considers himself qualified for a rating and feels the FAA has not fairly
dealt with him would be entitled to disregard licensing requirements
which are designed to insure technical skill and which have a substantial
and close relationship to public safety. It is clear that a pilot may not
become a law unto himself, and that "delay is unfortunate, but the
expense and annoyance of litigation is a price citizens must pay for
life in an orderly society. .. "'
It also seems apparent that the purpose of the prohibition against carry-
ing "passengers" in section 61.131 (b) is the safety of the occupants of
an airplane which the pilot has not established his qualifications to fly.
Whether those on the plane were paying passengers is irrelevant as the term
passenger "in common parlance . . . describes a physical status rather
than a technical legal status."' Thus, deliberate violation of section
61.131(b), together with a record not disclosing any arbitrary FAA
action, justifiably authorized the CAB to suspend petitioner's certificate.
E.S.K.
Procedure - Res Judicata - Requirement of Privity
In a previous action Aircraftsmen, Inc., successfully sued Jay Kirkman,
d/b/a Kirkman's Flying Service, for labor and material used in repairing
his airplane. In allowing recovery, the trial court overruled Kirkman's
defense that Aircraftsmen had failed to service the plane properly. Sub-
sequently, Kirkman, as independent executor and trustee of the estates
of Ann Slade Kirkman and Georgia Pearl Kirkman, filed the instant suit
for damages to this same airplane which had been purchased for the de-
cedents by Kirkman in his capacity as trustee. The plaintiff based the suit
on the failure of Aircraftsmen to service the plane properly. Aircrafts-
men filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the principle
of res judicata applied so as to render the issue of failure to service
properly, determined in favor of Aircraftsmen in the prior case, fore-
closed as between the parties in the present case. Kirkman contended that
the decision against him individually in the prior suit should not be binding
against the estates of the two Kirkman women. The trial court granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment. Held, affirmed: The parties to
both suits being in privity, the determination in the prior trial that Air-
craftsmen had properly serviced the airplane was binding on the parties
in the present suit. Kirkman v. Aircraftsmen, Inc., 408 S.W.2d 736 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1966).
'Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 409 (1953).
SVogrin v. Hedstrom, 220 F.2d 863, 866 (8th Cir.), cerl. denied, 350 U.S. 845 (195).
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Founded upon the principle that litigation should end at some point,1
the doctrine of res judicata requires that issues determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between
the same parties or their privies Privity within the purview of the
principles of res judicata has been defined as including "the mutual or
successive relationship to the same rights of property."' The court in the
instant case noted that "the same airplane and the same issues were in-
volved in both cases"; however, it brushed rather lightly over the re-
quirement of privity. After alluding to the fact that the airplane was
purchased after Kirkman became trustee of the estates of the two Kirkman
women, the court, noting that Kirkman continued to use the plane in his
flying service, seemingly implied that the allegation that the plane did not
belong to Jay Kirkman was a mere subterfuge invented to avoid the
effect of res judicata.4 The decision is manifestly correct and represents a
caveat to those plane owners who make the mistake of lackadaisically de-
fending a claim for repairs when they have an outstanding claim against
the repairman for damage arising out of a failure to use due care in making
those repairs which has not been consolidated in the repairman's suit.
M.M.W.
Merger - Labor Dispute - CAB Discretion
The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) intervened in a merger pro-
ceeding before the CAB, contending that approval of a merger between
Saturn Airlines, Inc. and Aaxico Airlines, Inc. would not be in the public
interest. ALPA's contention was based, first, on the long standing labor
dispute between it and Aaxico,' and second, on the allegation that the
merger was a sham for the sole purpose of transferring Saturn's trans-
atlantic certificate to Aaxico without presidential approval as required by
Section 801 of the Federal Aviation Act.' ALPA had instituted procedures
provided by the Railway Labor Act to settle its dispute prior to the filing
of the merger application.' In approving the merger, the CAB imposed
standard labor protective conditions, retained jurisdiction to enforce the
award of the System Board of Adjustment which was hearing the
ALPA/Aaxico dispute, and prohibited integration of the seniority lists
'See, e.g., Bros., Inc. v. Grace Mfg. Co., 320 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1963); Stanolind Oil &
Gas Co. v. State, 136 Tex. 26, 145 S.W.2d 569 (1940).
'Turner v. Jackson, 273 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) error ref. n.r'.e.
'Wilson v. Henwood, 337 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) error ref. n.r.e.
"Kirkman v. Aircraftsmen, Inc., 408 S.W.2d 736, 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). "The airplane
was purchased long after Jay Kirkman qualified as trustee. We are unable to find any authority
under this record or under the statutes of this state permitting the trustee to purchase an air-
plane and to use the same as a business for hire as was done here."
' For the history of this dispute and decision referring it to a System Board of Adjustment,
see 31 J. AIR L. & COM. 371 (1965).
272 Stat. 782 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964).
3 See note 1, supra.
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of the two carriers until the dispute was settled. The CAB found no
merit to ALPA's contention that Saturn, the smaller company, was to
be the surviving carrier merely to avoid presidential approval of the
transfer of the transatlantic certificate. ALPA appealed the CAB's de-
cision. Held, affirmed: Approval of the merger was not an abuse of CAB
discretion and was supported by the evidence. ALPA v. CAB, 360 F.2d
837 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
The court felt that the CAB was not required to act as a general labor
agency, and the action taken-retaining jurisdiction to insure compli-
ance with the System Board award-was sufficient, and stated, "we
attribute to a pending labor dispute no such overwhelming dominance
of the discretion vested in the CAB by Congress to weight all factors
relevant to the public interest consideration in a merger case." 4 The court
went on to state that section 401 (k) (4), which requires compliance with
the Railway Labor Act as a prerequisite to holding a certificate of public
convenience, does not require a different result since that section does
not mean the CAB itself must resolve all labor disputes, especially where
the dispute is in the process of resolution by a competent labor agency.
As for the contention that the merger was a sham to avoid presidential
approval of the transfer of the certificate for transatlantic flights, the
court pointed out that there were excellent business reasons on both sides
for the merger, and that the bargaining positions of the carriers were
not so disproportionate as to make the choice of leaving Saturn as the
surviving corporation irrational.
A.J.H. II
CAB - Route Abandonment - "Use It Or Lose It"
In August 1960, the CAB authorized and certificated North Central
Airlines to provide the Michigan cities of Cadillac, Reed City, and Pontiac
with one daily round-trip air service. In awarding the air service, the
CAB required each city to enplane a minimum of five outbound pas-
sengers a day-the familiar "use it or lose it" standard.1 Almost two
years later, in July 1962, North Central petitioned the CAB alleging
that public convenience and necessity required an amendment of its cer-
tificate deleting the air service to the three communities. The cities had
failed to maintain the required average minimum of five passengers a
day; therefore, under the "use it or lose it" policy, the Board ordered a
deletion of the service to these cities. The communities appealed from
this order alleging that the CAB, in failing to first establish a standard
4 360 F.2d at 840.
1 For a thorough discussion of the "use it or lose it" standard and its application to route
abandonment, see Dockser, Airline Service Abandonment and Consolidation-A Chapter in the
Battle Against Subsidization, 32 J. AIR L. & COM. 496 (1966).
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of performance for the certificated airline before applying the "use it or
lose it" policy to them, had wrongfully delegated its statutory authority
to the airline. They attempted to show that the scheduled flights offered
by the air carrier were not sufficient in number nor at convenient times,
and thereby the air carrier, by manipulation of its schedule, could hold
the cities under the five passengers a day minimum required by the Board
to prevent termination of service under its "use it or lose it" policy.
Held, affirmed: There was substantial evidence to support the finding of
the Board that service to the three cities should be deleted in the public
interest. City of Pontiac v. CAB, 361 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1966).
The court found that the record disclosed that the Board had weighed
and considered all of the relevant factors and, having done so, had de-
termined that the public interest was best served by deleting the air
service. The court then quoted from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion
in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB:'
The exercise of the process was committed to the Board, subject to limited
judicial review. Because the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a
matter for administrative competence, courts must not enter the allowable
area of the Board's discretion and must guard against the danger of sliding
unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious domain
of policy.
Although the agency in Phelps Dodge was the NLRB, the instant court
felt that the same principle would apply to matters which Congress en-
trusted to the CAB and, therefore, looked only to see whether there was
substantial evidence to support the Board's finding.
W.C. S.
Federal Courts - Findings - "Clearly Erroneous"
Appellant was in the business of leasing airplanes. Contemporaneously
with the purchase of the plane in question, the appellant leased it to a
third party who subsequently defaulted in his payments. As a result, the
appellant brought this action against the seller for loss resulting from the
failure of the lessee to make a substantial cash down payment as seller
had allegedly represented he would. The district court, sitting without
a jury, rendered a decision for the seller. Held, affirmed: The findings in
support of the judgment for the seller were not clearly erroneous in light
of the sharply conflicting oral evidence and the absence of written evidence
pertaining to the down payment. Airfleet Leasing Corp. v. Arkansas
Aviation Sales, Inc., 368 F.2d 526 (8th Cir. 1966).
The appellate court noted that the economics of the transaction tended
to support the appellant's contention. Normally, a corporation leasing to
one having an option to buy will not lend a proportionately large part of
2313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
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the purchase price unless it is assured that the purchaser has enough of
his own money invested to be motivated to pay the balance of the price
to protect his original balance. However, nowhere in correspondence be-
tween the parties was there any reference to the requirement of a down
payment by the lessee. While deciding that the appellant was not required
to meet the more exacting standard of "clear and convincing" proof, the
Eighth Circuit decided to apply the "clearly erroneous" standard within
the meaning of Rule 52, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In view of
the conflicting evidence, the court could not conclude that the trial court's
findings were clearly erroneous.
P.O.W.
FOREIGN
Warsaw Convention - France - Internal Flights
Father Loison, pilot and member of the Flying Club of Caen, having
aboard a gratuitous passenger, Marcel Rioult, husband of the plaintiff-
appellee, crashed the plane, killing both Marcel and himself. Father Loison
was forewarned of the possible risks of inclimate weather in the region of
his destination, yet he neglected upon departure to assure himself of the
existing weather conditions at that destination. Plaintiff brought suit
against the insurance company of the flying club, alleging inexcusable
fault (negligence) of the pilot for failure to heed the weather warnings.
The trial court rendered judgment in the amount of 70,000 francs on
the basis of fault of the pilot. The appellate court reversed; the Supreme
Court overruled and affirmed the trial court award. The court of renvoi
upheld the trial court. Held, afirmed: The fault of the pilot was inexcus-
able, and the award was upheld with interest. Mutuelle D'Assurances
Aeriennes (Insurance) v. Rioult.*I
There was no specific finding of inexcusable fault at the trial court level.
The appellate court, however, made such a specific finding within the
meaning of the law of 2 March 1957 dealing with the responsibility of
air carriers. This law adopted the Warsaw principles and limits, and made
them applicable to flights solely within France. Accordingly, the appellant-
insurance company asked the court to invoke the limitation provided by
Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention to limit the liability to 41,000
francs. The court held, however, that this original Warsaw limitation was
not applicable since The Hague Protocol, also incorporated into the do-
mestic law of France, had doubled the limitation for accidents arising
out of inexcusable fault. Awards such as this are common in those Euro-
pean countries which have enacted the principles of the Convention as
part of the domestic law of the country.
* This summary is from a translation of the complete report of the case as set out in 1966
Revue Frangaise de Droit Arien 237. Translator: Randy Williams.
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